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Abstract
This thesis addresses the problem of identifying email spear phishing attacks,
which are indicative of cyber espionage. Spear phishing consists of targeted emails sent
to entice a victim to open a malicious file attachment or click on a malicious link that
leads to a compromise of their computer. Current detection methods fail to detect emails
of this kind consistently.
The SPEar phishing Attack Detection system (SPEAD) is developed to analyze
all incoming emails on a network for the presence of spear phishing attacks. SPEAD
analyzes the following file types: Windows Portable Executable and Common Object
File Format (PE/COFF), Adobe Reader, and Microsoft Excel, Word, and PowerPoint.
SPEAD’s malware detection accuracy is compared against five commercially-available
email anti-virus solutions. Finally, this research quantifies the time required to perform
this detection with email traffic loads emulating an Air Force base network.
Results show that SPEAD outperforms the anti-virus products in PE/COFF
malware detection with an overall accuracy of 99.68% and an accuracy of 98.2% where
new malware is involved. Additionally, SPEAD is comparable to the anti-virus products
when it comes to the detection of new Adobe Reader malware with a rate of 88.79%.
Ultimately, SPEAD demonstrates a strong tendency to focus its detection on new
malware, which is a rare and desirable trait.

Finally, after less than 4 minutes of

sustained maximum email throughput, SPEAD’s non-optimized configuration exhibits
one-hour delays in processing files and links.
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I. Introduction
Cyber espionage is responsible for an annual loss of billions of dollars in the
United States alone [Rep09] [Eps08]. Because of the low cost of entry into and the
anonymity afforded by the Internet, any curious or incentivized person can likely gather
important information off private, corporate, or government computer networks [USC08].
Proprietary information from a company's innovative products or research and
development often holds a high monetary value. If that information is about national
defense assets or national strategy decision-making, then the value is arguably
immeasurable.
History has shown that espionage traditionally requires strategically-placed spies
or monitoring devices tailored and molded to the environment in which they operate.
The same is true in the way spies infiltrate computer networks. Inherently, espionage
occurs against a highly targeted victim or group. Some examples of this are the insider
amongst senior leaders of an organization [Mes08], the undercover detective within a
drug cartel, or the classic secret agent planted in a foreign agency. Cyber espionage is no
different in that its success is dependent on how well-tailored it is to its targeted victims.
In recent years, the cyber espionage threat has been widely published and
acknowledged by computer security analysts as wells as the mainstream public [Kei10]
[Zet10] [Mes08] [Hin08] [GET08] [Rep09] [SAN08]. Historically, the most common
method for infiltrating a network is through targeted spear phishing emails with malicious
file attachments or web site links [Kei10][Zet10] [SAN08]. The infamous attacks against
Google and dozens of other corporations in early 2010, dubbed ―Operation Aurora‖, used

targeted spear phishing emails in this manner [Jac10]. Both the emails and attachments
are products of effective social engineering methods that tailor the content to the
recipients of the emails. When an unsuspecting, targeted user opens the attachment or
clicks on the link, the cyber spy establishes a foothold on the computer and affected
network. The spy can then use his specialized malware to search for interesting data on
the victim computer or network and exfiltrate this potentially sensitive data, like source
code or intellectual property, from the victim network to a place of his choosing.
Because spear phishing emails are targeted, tailored to their targets, and relatively
rare when compared to other email-borne malware infection vectors, current technology
does not adequately protect against them. Commodity anti-virus applications generally
focus their detection on the malicious software that is already known to exist. The
objective of this research is to develop an email-based system that integrates automated
malware detection algorithms that provide the capability to detect previously unknown
malware. Such a system can be used to analyze files and web site links within emails,
specifically looking for and recognizing spear phishing emails that commonly use new
malware.

This capability significantly limits the primary attack vector for cyber

espionage. This system provides an invaluable risk mitigation and information protection
tool to a person, corporation, or government aiming to protect their trade secrets,
intellectual property, or crown jewels from cyber spies.
This thesis is organized into five chapters.

Chapter 2 reviews the relevant

literature, and it concludes with a review of the research related to the system designed in
this thesis. Chapter 3 describes the methodology used to design and evaluate this system.
The results and analysis of the experiments is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. Finally,
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Chapter 5 concludes this thesis body with a summary of this work, its contributions, and
where this work can be extended for future research.
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II. Literature Review

T

his chapter defines spear phishing and discusses the relevant bodies of research
needed to perform spear phishing detection. Section 2.1 introduces and defines

spear phishing.

Next, Section 2.2 discusses the relevancy of traditional phishing

detection research. A thorough review of malware detection technologies is provided in
light of static, dynamic, signature-based, and anomaly-based analysis techniques in
Section 2.3. Email-borne malicious code detection algorithms are described in Section
2.4. This chapter concludes with a description of the research ideas used for this thesis in
the context of the spear phishing attack detection framework.
2.1 Spear Phishing Defined
Spear phishing is a phishing attack targeted at a relatively smaller target set, and it
usually uses malicious attachments and web site hyperlinks in the email content. In
addition, the email content is highly customized to the target and would probably mean
almost nothing to an email recipient outside the target group or organization.
Spear phishing emails sent to a handful of selected victims is indicative of cyber
espionage. In addition, if the content of the email is very specific and relevant to the
industry, then this would be a telltale sign of cyber espionage. The same thought process
applies to a compromised web site that hosts information or services that cater to a select
business, organization, or niche market.
One way to differentiate between spear phishing and conventional phishing
attacks are by the level of sophistication of social engineering require by the attacker.
For phishing emails, knowing the demographics, locale, or common financial institutions
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in an area aid an attacker in customizing their phishing attack. However, for spear
phishing attacks, both the emails and attachments/links are the products of very focused
social engineering methods that tailor the content to each individual recipient of the
emails.
Spear phishing attacks are email-borne infection vectors, so there is a relatively
long and arbitrary amount of time from when an email is delivered until the malicious file
or code compromises its target. Also, spear phishing has a different purpose than a worm
or email virus. Its goal is not to indiscriminately spread far and wide but to
surreptitiously establish a foothold into a specific network or system.
2.2 Detecting Phishing Attacks
Identifying phishing attempts is a difficult and unsolved problem due to the
inherent vulnerability residing at the receiving end of phishing emails—a human. The
prevalence of phishing web sites and emails attests to the success phishers are having
with their attempts. When a web site or email emulates a known legitimate site or email,
it is relatively easy to fool most Internet users. While phishing training may help the
human only slightly, significant advancements are made toward effective technical
solutions that are categorized into two groups: content-based filtering and applicationbased filtering.
2.2.1 Content-Based Filtering
Content-based filtering refers to statistical analysis, data mining, feature set
selection, machine learning, and/or heuristics-based detection mechanisms applied to
either email content or web site content.
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Fette et al. establish a machine learning algorithm on a feature set designed to
highlight human-targeted deception behaviors in email [FST07].

Their approach is

named PILFER, and it is a machine learning-based approach to classifying phishing
attempts. PILFER uses data directly present in email as well as data collected from
external sources. This combined approach creates a feature vector, which is used to train
a model for classification. Their feature vector consists of 10 features: Internet Protocol
(IP) addresses within web links, age of linked-to domains, non-matching links, ―Here‖
links to a non-modal domain (anomalous links to the non-dominate domain present in the
email), HTML (Hyper Text Markup Language) emails, number of links, number of
domains, number of dots (e.g., www.this.is.a.bad.site.com), contains JavaScript, and
output from third party spam filters. PILFER inputs this feature vector into a random
forest as a classifier, where numerous decision tress are created. Preliminary experiments
show a 96% detection rate with only a 0.1% false positive rate over 860 phishing and
6,950 non-phishing emails.
L’Huillier et al. propose an online phishing classification scheme using
adversarial data mining and signaling games in [LWF09]. They implement a gametheoretic data mining framework that uses dynamic games of incomplete information to
build a classifier to detect phishing attempts. The feature set consists of email contentbased features, of which there are four categories: email structures related to different
email formats, properties of every link in a message, HTML/JavaScript/forms used, and
the SpamAssasin’s output score for the email in question. This work achieves a high
detection accuracy of 99%.
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Bergholz et al. propose a number of novel features that are tailored to phishing
email detection [BDG+10]. These new features extend the work of L’Hullier et al. by
adding a word list to their basic feature set, and advanced graphical features are added as
well. These graphical features are image distortion (i.e., attempts to defeat character
recognition tools), logo detection (i.e., compared to original logo), and hidden text
salting. Hidden text salting consists of random strings, spacing, coloring, spelling, etc. to
fool automated appliances but remain invisible to humans. These features are passed into
a text classification-based classifier (e.g., random forests or support vector machines).
Experiments with these novel features yield a 99.46% accuracy rate, which is slightly
higher than that reported by L’Hullier et al.
2.2.2 Application-Based Filtering
Application-based filtering refers to a specific method of implementing a phishing
detection or prevention mechanism. This category encompasses email client or web
browser plugins as well as modified email architecture.
Zhang et al. developed an automated test bed for evaluating anti-phishing tools in
[ZEC+07]. They evaluate 10 popular appliance-based anti-phishing tools using 200
phishing URLs (Uniform Resource Locators, or links) from two sources and over 500
legitimate URLs. The results of their evaluation show that only one of the tools could
consistently identify over 90% of phishing URLs. However, this same tool also had a
42% false positive rate. In addition, the authors point out numerous methods to exploit
vulnerabilities in multiple anti-phishing tools that resulted in phishing sites being labeled
as legitimate.

Most of the tools use a blacklist of URLs that they would obtain
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dynamically and frequently. Only one tool uses heuristics-based detection instead of an
explicit blacklist. This tool also has high false positive rates. The major contribution of
this effort is the authors’ conclusion that the success of anti-phishing tools using
blacklists relies on very large amounts of data being collected frequently.
Crain et al. propose a tool to assist users in identifying legitimate emails [COP10].
This tool, called Trusted Email, allows companies to establish keys with their
clients/customers. This key is used to sign and encrypt emails between the legitimate
company and its user. This approach’s strength is that it uses existing technology in a
novel way to dramatically improve email security.

A client-based plugin provides

feedback to users when: 1) a key establishment email arrives, 2) a signed email arrives,
and 3) a forged email is detected. A small pilot study shows that all users reject all
emails marked as phishing, and they also accept all emails that are signed. However,
most of them also rejected all unsigned, legitimate emails, which may be a result of the
small group of people and their insight into this research.
2.2.3 Limitations of Phishing Detection
The content filtering techniques focus their detection on anomalous behavior
indicative of phishing. This implies that all phishing attempts use non-standard behavior.
However, spear phishing specifically emulates a valid user behaving in a legitimate
manner and emailing appropriate recipients.

Therefore, the content-based filtering

algorithms likely will not recognize legitimate-looking spear phishing emails.
On the other hand, application-based filtering shows promise, but it relies heavily
on the use of blacklists that must be constantly updated.

8

But there is an inherent

challenge with this: any new phishing attempts will have to be discovered first before it
can be added to a known bad blacklist. Even heuristic-based detection suffers from
unacceptable false positive rates [ZEC+07]. Therefore, current application-based and
content filtering-based phishing detection techniques likely will not catch spear phishing
attacks, especially ones crafted and targeted for the purpose of cyber espionage.
2.3 Detecting Malware
Malware comes in many forms with many names: virus, Trojan, worm,
downloader, rootkit, keylogger, adware, spyware, and more.

For simplicity and

convenience, the root of the name (i.e., ―malicious software‖) is used to define the
generic use of the term. Any unwanted and malicious program or code running on a
system is referred to as malware.
Malware detection is the implementation of a technique or techniques that attempt
to identify programs or code that behave in a malicious manner contrary to the intended
use of a system. Naturally, detection of unknown malware is the goal, assuming a cyber
spy will use sophisticated, novel malicious programs to establish footholds on a computer
and within a network. A malware detector typically takes two inputs: 1) the program or
code under inspection, and 2) its knowledge of malicious behavior [IdM07]. While there
are a myriad of techniques currently in use operationally and academically that reliably
detect most malware on a system, these techniques can be categorized into three analysis
methods based on how they gather information to detect malware: static, dynamic, or
hybrid [IdM07] [HoB05].

These analysis methods are further broken down into

signature-based and anomaly-based detection, which differ in their manner of
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categorizing their knowledge of malicious behaviors. All of the following methods of
malware detection focus on Windows Portable Executables due to the overwhelming
prevalence of this type of malware in the wild [VxH10].
2.3.1 Static Analysis Techniques
Static analysis gathers information about malicious behavior using syntactical or
structural properties of the program under inspection [IdM07]. It requires establishing
sets of file features, or feature vectors, based on file content. This file content typically
consists of byte sequences (n-grams), metadata, and/or sequences of instructions and
application programming interface (API) or system calls. One advantage of statically
analyzing code is that, in general, it can be done relatively quickly without the need to
execute the malware. Another advantage is that the program, ideally, can be analyzed
holistically due to the availability of all the malware’s code. Code obfuscation can make
this more difficult, but, more often than not, malware is not obfuscated. Thus, static
analysis can yield insight into how the malware is programmed and not just visible
behavior at runtime.
2.3.1.1 Signature-Based Static Analysis
Signature-based analysis of malware has historically been a euphemism for
commodity anti-virus products. However, the use of the term in this paper simply means
that the detection algorithm compares a suspect program against known malicious
features. Signature-based analysis includes most of the automated malware detection
mechanisms. This is because most data mining methods use machine learning on feature
sets based on n-grams, strings, instructions/code, file headers, and program structure.
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Schultz et al. is an early adopter of a data mining technique for malware analysis.
In [SEZS01], they use static analysis-based data mining for detecting new malicious
executables. They use three data mining schemes to identify malicious Windows or MSDOS executables: DLL information, strings, and byte sequences (or n-grams). These
schemes differ in their approach to extract feature sets from the executables. These
feature sets were used to train RIPPER (an inductive rule learner), Naive-Bayes, and
Multi Naïve-Bayes (with voting) classifiers.

The approach with the best detection

accuracy is the one using the GNU strings program to extract strings as feature sets for a
Naïve Bayes classification algorithm. However, Schultz et al acknowledge that strings
are not robust and can be sufficiently evaded by encrypting the malware.
A similar approach is used by Kolter et al. in [KoM04] and later in [KoM06],
where they used data mining and n-gram analysis to tackle two malware detection issues:
(1) classifying between benign and malicious executables, and (2) categorizing malicious
executables according to their payload. This method uses n-gram analysis to determine
the n-grams with the highest information gain. The top n-grams become the feature sets
which the classifier algorithms use to determine if an executable is malicious. These ngrams are used to train classifier algorithms based on the following inductive learning
methods: Instance-Based Learner, TFIDF, Naïve-Bayes, support vector machines
(SVMs), decision trees, boosted Naïve-Bayes, boosted SVMs, and boosted decision trees.
The boosted decision tree performs better than the rest of the classifiers.

This

methodology has been fielded as an application called MECS, the Malicious Executable
Classification System.

One acknowledged limitation to this method is its high

computational overhead when selecting features.
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Abou-Assaleh et al. continues this work in the area of byte-sequences and data
mining by using a Common N-Gram (CNG) analysis classification method to create
malware profile signatures in [ACK+04] and [ACKS04]. These profile signatures are
class profiles of normalized frequencies of the most frequently-appearing n-grams. The
authors use n-grams between one and 10 bytes in size, and they set lower and upper
bounds on the number of n-grams used to 20 and 5,000, respectively. The experiment in
[ACK+04] achieves an average accuracy of 98%, but it only tested 65 Windows
executables.

The experiments in [ACKS04] use almost 800 samples of Windows

executables, but the average detection rate dropped to 91%.
Henchiri and Japkowicz use machine learning and knowledge of malware family
types for feature selection in [HeJ06]. Specifically, they focus on intra-family and interfamily n-gram thresholds to strategically select or eliminate features for the final feature
selection. This focus on malware family types for feature selection is the first of its kind.
Experiments with 3,000 samples (approximately half of them malicious) and varying
feature sets show a detection accuracy consistently in the mid-90th percentile.
Sung et al. pioneers the use of sequences of Windows API calls in a signaturebased methodology in [SXC+04]. The authors create a signature-based detection system
called Static Analyzer of Vicious Executables (SAVE) that extracts API sequences from
suspect programs and compares these sequences against a signature database of known
malicious behavior. Each API call is mapped to a global 32-bit integer identification
number. The 16 most significant bits represent the Win32 module, and the 16 least
significant bits represent the API call in this module. An API calling sequence is the
sequence of these 32-bit numbers. The similarity of the API sequence with that of
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signatures in a database of malicious API sequences is determined.

The similarity

between the API sequences under investigation and known malicious sequences is based
on the cosine measure, the extended Jaccard measure, and the Pearson correlation
measure for similarities between sequences. If certain sequences are deemed sufficiently
similar, then the program is labeled as malicious. On only 20 malware samples, this
approach successfully detected all of them. However, an experiment on larger sample
sizes is needed to prove the reliability and robustness of this technique. Also, this
method of malware detection can be evaded by polymorphic and metamorphic malware.
Ye et al. extend [SXC+04]’s work on API call sequences with their development
of an Intelligent Malware Detection System (IMDS) that uses Objective-Oriented
Association (OOA) mining-based classification in [YWL+07]. This work requires the
development of a Portable Executable parser to construct the API execution sequences.
The authors generate rules based on these API sequences by using their own extension to
the FP-Growth algorithm, called the OOA_Fast_FP-Growth algorithm. They test their
algorithm against nearly 3,000 executables, and IMDS achieves a 93% accuracy rate in
detecting malware. However, because the feature set is based on API sequences, this
technique is limited by the same polymorphic and metamorphic evasion techniques as the
malware detection scheme in [SXC+04].
In [CJS+05], Christodorescu et al. use abstract models, or templates, that describe
the behavior of malicious code. These templates of malware signatures consist of a 3tuple of instructions, variables, and symbolic constants. These templates are formed in an
attempt to generalize the signature of an instance of malware while maintaining the
semantics of the malicious code’s behavior. This algorithm successfully detects all
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variants of certain malware, but the sample size is relatively small. Additionally, this
scheme relies on IDA Pro’s ability to disassemble a binary accurately. Otherwise, the
algorithm’s detection algorithm is significantly hindered.
In [TSF09], Tabish et al. show that malicious and benign files are inherently
different at the byte level. Thus, they use statistical analysis on byte-level content of a
file divided into fix-sized blocks. Then, this approach uses statistical and informationtheoretic features for these blocks to quantify the file content at the byte level. This
scheme is tested against trained classifier models for six common benign file types
(DOC, EXE, JPG, MP3, PDF, and ZIP) and six common malware types (backdoor,
Trojan, virus, worm, constructor, and miscellaneous). The results of these experiments
show a detection accuracy over 90% for all tested malware types. While this scheme also
shows a relatively high accuracy for classifying malware into families, its overall
detection accuracy appears to be no better than most other malware detection methods.
2.3.1.2 Anomaly-Based Static Analysis
Most static analysis-based malware detection focuses on characterizing the unique
aspects of malicious files.

On the other hand, anomaly-based analysis focuses on

characterizing legitimate files and then looks for anomalous file behavior.
In [SWL07], Stolfo et al. focus on a new type of stealthy malware threat called
embedded malware. Their approach uses statistical analysis on byte-level file content to
detect anomalous files segments that may be indicative of embedded malicious code.
This technique attempts to model numerous benign file types to produce a model
revealing what all files of each type should look like.
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Anomalous and suspicious

behavior is indicated by any deviation from these models. Each file type is represented
by a set of statistical n-gram models based on a compact representation of each file type,
called a Fileprint. This detection scheme is put to experiment using three scenarios: 1)
detecting malware embedded in a randomly chosen benign file, 2) distinctly detecting
malware amongst benign executables, and 3) identifying obfuscated, self-encrypted files.
This technique is able to detect between 72% and 95% of malicious code embedded in
PDF files, depending on the location of the embedding. The detection rate for the
malware versus benign executable and self-encrypted files varies widely, which suggests
that the comparison method may have been too weak for reliable malware or malicious
encrypted file detection in general.
In [SKF08], Shafiq et al. enhance the pioneering work of Stolfo et al. by using
statistical anomaly detection to identify embedded malware and locate its position within
an infected file. This technique addresses the issue of commodity anti-virus software's
inability, in general, to detect embedded malware using their signature-based detection
engines. This technique characterizes the statistical properties of a benign file using
Markov n-grams, which are conditional n-gram distributions (as opposed to traditional ngrams). The authors conclude that a simple n-gram distribution does not yield enough
information to accurately identify embedded malware. This algorithm then uses an
entropy rate to quantify the variations in the Markov n-grams of a benign file that are
caused by embedded malware. The algorithm looks for anomalous entropy rates that do
not fall within the Gaussian distribution of benign entropy rates. While this method does
require a training phase, malware is not required to train this algorithm’s detector,
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making it a "true" anomaly detector that relies completely on a robust model of benign
behavior.
This approach does have several limitations. While this method of embedded
malware detection outperforms commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) anti-virus products and
the few other embedded malware detectors, it does so at the cost of a high rate of false
positives. The false positive rates for .doc and .pdf files are high due to the inherent
ubiquity of embedded objects within these file formats. Because of this, the benign
behavior model for these file types take into account entropy rates that are hindered by
numerous perturbations from embedded objects. Also, this method of detection is
vulnerable to a mimicry attack that shapes the embedded malware to have a statistical
distribution similar to "normal" or benign behavior.
2.3.1.3 Limitations of Static Analysis
There are numerous limitations to static analysis. Investigating a program’s full
functionality may never be possible if there are complex inter-component/system
interactions between the malware and other collaborative code from other programs, as
discussed in [LeM06]. Also, in their work on testing malware detectors, [ChJ04] explain
how code/data obfuscation caused by encryption, packing, polymorphism, and
metamorphism is a significant obstacle to overcome, especially if the static analysisbased technique is to be automated. COTS anti-virus products are notoriously vulnerable
to these evasion techniques. For example, on-access obfuscation, where instructions are
decrypted only during execution, makes static analysis extremely difficult and timeconsuming [ChJ04].
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The efforts of Moser, et al. in [MKK07] further address the limits of static
analysis for malware detection. They specifically focus on the viability of evading
semantics-aware detection schemes, where the behavior of the malware is modeled
abstractly to determine whether a specific piece of code exhibits a specific behavior or
function. Moser et al. accomplish this by using a primitive known as an opaque constant,
which refers to a code sequence that loads a constant into a register and whose value
cannot be determined statically. Opaque constants strategically replace certain register
load operations with semantically equivalent instructions, thus generating a code
sequence that always produces the same result. Effectively, control flow can become
scrambled, and data locations and usage can be hidden from static analysis.

This

technique is applied to the source code of the target program, which allows much
flexibility in applying these obfuscation transformations. In fact, the authors prove that
the creation of an algorithm to determine the precise result of an opaque constantobfuscated code sequence is an NP-hard problem.
2.3.2 Dynamic Analysis Techniques
Detecting malware by analyzing the code during execution is called dynamic
analysis. This run-time analysis technique provides relatively immediate and measurable
empirical evidence of what an unknown binary is doing or trying to accomplish. As a
bonus, dynamic analysis is effective against binaries that obfuscate themselves or are
self-modifying. This is due to the fact that the destiny of all programs is to be run on a
system, so when the program is running, its behavior and subsequent system
modifications can be captured.

17

2.3.2.1 Signature-Based Dynamic Analysis
Kephart and Arnold pioneered the efforts for automated extraction of malware
signatures in [KeA94]. They developed an effective extraction method for malware
signatures by allowing viruses to infect large numbers of files. With a plethora of various
infected files, they harvest byte sequences in sizes of 12 to 36 bytes. This process yields
a myriad of signatures, and the ones with the lowest estimated false positive probabilities
are selected for the final signature-based detection engine.

This methodology was

incorporated into IBM’s AntiVirus product during the 1990s.

Arnold and Tesauro

extended this work into a neural network classifier in [ArT00]. They use n-grams and
multiple neural networks in a voting procedure to eliminate false positives and aid in
detecting unknown Win32 viruses.
Lee and Mody successfully automate malware detection using runtime behavioral
data and machine learning in [LeM06]. Their methodology quantifies a file’s runtime
behavior into a form of sequenced events. It normalizes this data for canonical-based
storage in a database. Their scheme constructs classifiers for machine learning with the
stored event sequences as input. They use a technique called Opaque Object to represent
this classification data. This specific approach allows objects to represent data in rich
syntax and semantics. It also yields a similarity distance between any two objects, which
factors into their classification method based on clustering. The authors use a Microsoftdeveloped distributed system of virtual machine-based ―workers‖ with kernel mode
monitor agents running on them. As files under investigation are executed, the monitor
agent intercepts and monitors all system calls in kernel mode. The authors acknowledge
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the limiting factors of lack of code structural information, environment conditions, and
ineffective virtualization as obstacles to accurate malware classification.
Willems et al. takes steps towards automating much of the dynamic analysis
required by advanced, in-depth malware analysis in [WHF07]. They use their own tool
(now a commercial product) called CWSandbox to monitor all malware system calls and
generate a detailed report to simplify a malware analyst’s task. They use API hooking
and dynamic link library (DLL) injection to run CWSandbox as a rootkit, thus evading
detection by sophisticated malware.

CWSandbox collects information exposing the

malware’s behavior. This information consists of file modification/creation, Windows
registry changes, DLLs that are loaded, virtual memory footprint, process creation,
network connections, and miscellaneous events pertaining to kernel driver or protected
storage access attempts. This tool is unique in its ability to bridge the gap between
automated, autonomous malware detection and in-depth, human-based analysis.
Unfortunately, it is still a relatively slow method of automating malware detection, with
an effective throughput of only 500 binaries per day per instance of CWSandbox.
Bailey et al. extend Willem et al.’s efforts in fingerprinting malware behavior
using runtime system state changes in [BOA+07]. They execute malware in virtualized
environments to perform causal tracing of system objects created during the malware’s
execution. These system events are exported to a server that builds causal dependency
graphs of these events. This aids in validating that the events being caused by the
malware are not normal system events. This approach goes beyond the capability of
CWSandbox by using classification algorithms to automate detection of malware. The
authors implement a tree structure based on a hierarchical clustering algorithm. An
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inconsistency measure is calculated for this tree structure to break the tree into
meaningful groups or clusters. These clusters serve as models to measure program
behaviors against.
Ding et al. implement a behavior-based dynamic heuristic analysis approach to
proactively detect unknown malware in [DJB+09]. This approach categorizes behavior
features based on Win32 API calls and their specific parameters. An automatic behaviortracing system is developed to collect the behavior features during runtime. The authors
opt for two independent detection models: a statistical detection model and a mixture of
expert (MoE) model. The malware behavior features are broken into six classes of
malicious behaviors related to files, processes, windows operation, networking, registry
settings, and windows services. After comparing the results of malicious and benign
executables in the context of these six classes, a more detailed 35-dimension feature
vector is defined where each dimension accounts for one kind of behavior. This feature
vector is the input to the statistical and MoE models for ultimate classification of
malware. After experiments, the statistical model of malware detection achieves a 96%
true positive detection rate with a nearly 35% false positive rate. The MoE model
achieves a 1% false positive rate, but it can only reach a 75% detection accuracy rate.
Dai et al. takes a different approach to dynamically quantify malware behavior in
[DGL09]. The authors focus their work on feature set selection via static and dynamic
means. This hybrid method of extracting statistical information is relatively rare and,
thus, unique. This comprehensive effort uses multiple data mining approaches: simple
heuristics (PE headers and strings), n-grams, static instruction sequences, and dynamic
instruction sequences. A separate algorithm is used to obtain instruction sequence blocks
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of significance, and the top instruction associations are selected for the feature set. The
selected feature sets for each data mining approach are utilized for support vector
machine training. The dynamic instruction sequence-based SVM outperformed the other
data mining approaches with a malware detection accuracy of over 91%.
2.3.2.2 Anomaly-Based Dynamic Analysis
True anomaly-based dynamic analysis is a rare technique for malware detection.
Many methods may claim they are anomaly-based, but for the purpose of this research,
anomaly-based implies a quantification of benign behavior, not a quantification of
heuristic-based malicious behavior. It is difficult to find published work in this area,
which implies that this method of malware detection is still novel, or this method is not a
worthwhile pursuit.

However, the idea of quantifying benign program execution at

runtime should be no less daunting than doing it statically. At least one published effort
clearly attempts this task, and another non-published effort successfully achieves this,
which is discussed in Section 2.5.
Apap et al. present a host-based intrusion detection system for Windows that
focuses specifically on registry accesses in [AHH+02]. The Registry is a worthwhile
location to monitor runtime execution of programs. This is because Registry activity
tends to be regular over time, with most programs accessing only at startup/shutdown or
at specific time intervals. Therefore, anomalous and irregular activity may be relatively
easy to identify. Additionally, many malware infections launch programs or change keys
that have not been launched or changed since the operating system had first been
installed. The authors exploit this beneficial scenario by developing a system called
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RAD (Registry Anomaly Detection) to monitor registry accesses in real-time to detect the
activity of malware.

This work is an extension of a network packet header-based

anomaly detector called PHAD (Packet Header Anomaly Detection). The RAD system is
divided into three basic components: an audit sensor, a model generator, and an anomaly
detector. The sensors log registry activity to a database while the model generator reads
this data to determine models of normal registry behavior. Finally, the anomaly detector
uses the model as a point of comparison for all registry accesses to determine their
potentially malicious intent. After training RAD for two days on benign behavior, the
system is put to test. It performs well, achieving a 100% detection rate of malicious
activity in certain scenarios. However, there are many false positives in most scenarios,
and most of these false positives are caused by legitimate processes that did not run
during the two-day training phase. This lack of an exhaustive training phase reveals an
inherent limitation to dynamic analysis-based anomaly detection.
2.3.2.3. Limitations of Dynamic Analysis
Just as there are limitations to static analysis that are addressed by dynamic
analysis, the opposite is true as well.

Dynamic analysis-based malware detection

generally requires orders of magnitude more time to perform than static-based
techniques. Also, the malware has to run for a long enough duration to capture sufficient
malware information, but it also has to be run quickly enough to be scalable. This makes
dynamic analysis vulnerable to intentional or inadvertent time-delayed evasion
techniques. Specifically, when a program under inspection is executed, the monitoring
agent only witnesses a single instance of execution of that program. If malware is
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programmed to activate at a certain time, dynamic analysis will almost surely miss this
behavior. Bailey et al. draw attention to the fact that anti-VM (virtual machine) evasion
techniques exist [BOA+07]. Finally, malware that depends on user input may not reveal
its full functionality without manual intervention or an advanced clicking emulator to
simulate humanlike mouse clicks.
2.4 Detecting Email-Borne Malicious Code
Detecting malware sent by email can be seen as an extension to the malware
detection problem in general. However, there are some advantages to detecting malware
within special purpose applications. This is further discussed in the next section. It is
important to note that many email-based malware detection solutions do not take
advantage of the special purpose application, and they are simply commodity anti-virus
products that run the same scans with the same signatures used on client-based systems.
While this is convenient and necessary to prevent common, known malware from
infiltrating a network via email, it still lacks the ability to detect most new malware and
0-day attacks. Fortunately, there is work in this area that has set the precedent for
tracking malicious emails.
Shih et al. propose a method of detecting unknown malicious emails [SCY05].
Their method evaluates the malice of an email attachment by focusing solely on the
behavior of the email and not the contents of the attachment itself. This technique
evaluates three classifiers against four versions of commodity anti-virus software. The
three classifiers it uses are the Naïve Bayes, the Bayesian network, and the decision tree
classifiers. Their feature sets consist of 11 email content-based features: mail content
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type, mail size, MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) format, attachment,
number of attachments, attachment size, script language, subject, carbon copy, and
recipient. All three of these classification approaches outperform the four anti-virus
products in detecting five variants of known malware. However, targeted and tailored
spear phishing emails will likely evade a detection technique that relies on anomalous
email behavior.
Schultz et al. makes a significant contribution to this field of email-borne malware
detection with their seminal work call MEF (Malicious Email Filter) [SEZB01]. MEF is
a tool that detects malicious Windows executables using Procmail and a UNIX mail
server. This tool offers three key contributions: 1) detection of known and unknown
malware attachments, 2) automatic distributed propagation of detection models, and 3)
ability to monitor the propagation of malicious email attachments. This framework uses
a Naïve Bayes classifier to detect malware, and this classifier is generated by a data
mining algorithm trained over a given set of data. MEF has the ability to detect similar
but unknown malware, and its probabilistic classification methods allow the tool to
identify borderline executables, meaning they are on the border of the threshold between
malicious and benign. These borderline cases provide an opportunity for expert analysts
to make a determination. In turn, the detection models can be updated with this valuable
new insight, and MEF can update a central server with the updated detection models for
distribution to other MEF outposts.
MEF also tracks the propagation of email attachments.

It stores a unique

identifier (hash) for every email attachment in a database as well as log data pertinent to
each email. The logs of malicious attachments are sent to the central server. Therefore,
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the central server can use the unique identifier and contextual log data to track the spread
of malicious attachments via email. MEF is tested against a signature-based malware
detection approach that emulates commodity anti-virus software on mail servers. The
data set consists of 4,300 files, 1,000 of which are benign.

MEF significantly

outperforms the signature-based approach with an accuracy rate of over 97%. The
experiments do not evaluate MEF’s detection model updating or its malicious attachment
propagation tracking. Additionally, the detection of unknown malware is not thoroughly
evaluated.
Bhattacharyya et al. extends the work of Schultz et al. with their Malicious Email
Tracking (MET) system [BaH02].

MET shifts focus away from the three major

capabilities of MEF and towards a dramatically improved malicious email propagation
tracking capability. MET maintains a database of statistics about the trajectory of email
attachments, and this affords the tool a global perspective on the spread of malicious
software via email (assuming a global MET presence).

This database of email

attachment trajectory data also provides the ability to determine all the points of entry of
email-borne malware into a network. Another tangential benefit of this technique is the
ability to reduce the spread of self-replicating malware through email.
MET gathers the core statistics for each email attachment, which consists of the
prevalence of an attachment and its birth rate. Prevalence is the number of times a MET
client observes an attachment, and the birth rate is the average number of copies sent
from the same user. MET has built-in heuristics to determine if an attachment is selfpropagating, and this information can be communicated to a central MET server for
distribution to other MET clients. This is how self-replicating malware can be prevented
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after the initial infection. The limitation to this approach is obvious: there will be an
initial infection and likely multiple infections before the trajectory data begins to line up
with the classifier model. Also, a targeted spear phishing attack is designed to emulate
legitimate behavior and appropriate recipients. Thus, a detection technique that tracks
email trajectory likely will not recognize anything anomalous in a spear phishing email.
Finally, there is one documented framework for detecting 0-day worms and
viruses in email, as proposed by Sidiroglou et al. in [SIK+05]. This framework is an
email worm vaccine architecture, and it uses the Registry Anomaly Detection (RAD)
mechanism, designed by Apap et al. in [AHH+02], to detect malware in emails. RAD
monitors Windows registry accesses in real-time to detect the activity of malware. The
authors design the system to use a Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) proxy between
the Internet and the protected email server. This proxy intercepts all incoming emails,
extracts all attachments, and runs the attachments on a virtual machine that uses RAD to
detect anomalous behavior. Upon detection of a malicious file and therefore malicious
email, the SMTP proxy is notified, and the email message is discarded. Experiments are
run with publicly available attacks delivered via email, and this system achieves a 100%
detection rate with a false positive rate of 5%. However, this anomaly-based dynamic
analysis technique has its drawbacks. Because RAD has to be trained on ―normal‖
behavior, many false positives are caused by legitimate processes that do not run during
the training phase of RAD. This lack of an exhaustive training phase reveals an inherent
limitation to this method of malware detection in emails. Additionally, these experiments
do not appear to use unknown malware, which leave the claim of detecting 0-day worms
and viruses untested. Finally, not all malicious code alters the Windows registry. This
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limits the detection footprint of RAD, which limits the scope of detectable malware
offered by this email worm vaccine architecture.
The email-focused malware detection techniques discussed to this point are either
unlikely to detect novel malware in targeted emails due to the difficulty in detecting
malware that leaves such a small network footprint (i.e., it does not spread
indiscriminately like a worm), or their ability to detect unknown malware remains
untested. Also, none of these techniques takes into account the download of malware or
the exploitation of web browsers caused by URLs within emails. This is a significant
drawback to using any of these techniques to detect spear phishing emails that use
malicious URLs.
2.5 Spear Phishing Detection Framework
This section’s purpose is to extend the literature review into the introduction of
the spear phishing detection framework proposed in this research. Special purpose and
general purpose systems are discussed first, followed by the principles behind a malware
detection approach that combines static and dynamic analysis. Finally, the two malware
detection algorithms selected for this research are introduced and discussed.
This research effort attempts to build a spear phishing detection framework that is
implemented at the email server/service level of the network. It uses both dynamic and
static analysis techniques to detect the presence of malicious email attachments,
especially novel/unknown malware.
There are two important questions about this spear phishing detection framework
that need to be answered: 1) Why implement this framework at the server/service level
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and not as a client-based application? and 2) Why use a dynamic analysis-based approach
when it is notorious for its overhead costs in time and resources? Both of these questions
are answered in the following sections.
2.5.1 Special Purpose versus General Purpose Systems
Client workstations are general purpose computers, thus they have to be able to
handle multiple types of user input, applications, and functionality. Because of this, the
set of all possible actions that a general purpose computer can perform is intractably
large.

Essentially, their behavior can be unpredictable. In addition, client-based

computers have to provide virtually instantaneous feedback and response, or real-time
computing, to user inputs. This has become the norm and the expectation from virtually
all computer users. Because of this, dynamic-analysis based malware detection has to
take into account a myriad of possible files, processes, and network connections being
created, modified, and/or terminated. Also, the malware detection product cannot
introduce much latency, or else the enterprise-wide adoption of the product will meet
many obstacles.
Email servers, on the other hand, are intended to be special purpose computers,
though not quite as special purpose as an embedded system (i.e., cell phone, DVD player,
electronic gadget, etc.). However, in comparison to client workstations, email server
behavior is more predictable, and so is its file, process, and network connection creation,
modification, and/or termination. Even though commercial email server software is
designed to meet the needs of a broad and diverse customer base, it still operates
according to a much more limited baseline behavior than a general purpose system does.
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Additionally, latency is not a significant issue. Email delays are acceptable to the point
that they are not surprising, and many times they go unnoticed by the email recipients.
Therefore, malware detection products have more leeway in time to perform more indepth analysis on email.
In addition, having a malware detection framework at the network boundary
can stop malware at the point of entry into a network instead of waiting to stop it at the
client. In most situations, this is a preferred approach over letting the malware reach its
target before preventing its execution. Typically, there are many network points of entry,
but using email as an attack vector has proven to be effective and reliable for cyber
espionage. Also, it is easier to manage/administrate software at the server/service-level
vice the client/distributed user-level.
2.5.2 Combining Dynamic and Static Analysis of Malware
In almost all related work for malware detection, authors emphasize the need to
augment static analysis with dynamic analysis and vice versa. Hybrid approaches are
somewhat rare, but the benefits of combining both approaches are synergistic. While
static analysis prevails in speed and exhaustive code analysis, it falters in obfuscated code
and embedded malware analysis. While dynamic analysis lacks in analysis speed and
time-delayed evasion, it prevails in determining actual code execution sequences and
functional behavior. Using a spear phishing detection framework that follows a hybrid
approach for malware detection alleviates many of the limitations of static and dynamic
analysis.
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2.5.3 Using Malware Type Recognition (MaTR) for Static Analysis
A very important piece of a spear phishing prevention framework is its ability to
identify malicious attachments to emails. There are precedents for accomplishing this
using static analysis-based techniques for malware detection. Specifically, the MEF
[SEZB01] and MET [BaH02] tools, in addition to Shih et al.’s work [SCY05],
demonstrate that using signature-based static analysis in combination with email services
is a viable and effective means to detecting email-borne malware.
Malware Type Recognition (MaTR) is a research initiative that extends the
malware detection technologies to include the additional context of malware family types
[DRP+10]. At the time of this thesis research, MaTR prototype version 1.00 is the current
prototype.

This prototype implements MaTR’s best-performing pattern recognition

technique and feature sets to perform automated static analysis for malware detection and
malware type classification. The additional context of malware type provides significant
actionable information for network defenders.

This situational awareness is vitally

important for identifying cyber espionage through spear phishing-borne malware, second
only to the tool’s fundamental ability to determine malware from non-malware. Also,
this context can be used to prioritize more aggressive dynamic analysis efforts.
In the context of this thesis, MaTR is a signature-based static analysis scheme that
is comparable to Tabish et al.’s work in [TSF09]. Thus, MaTR is one of the only static
analysis-based methods for performing malware type classification as well as having very
high detection rates (>99%). It uses program structures and anomaly features of malware
that are unique to certain classifier models. This method of static analysis is proven to be
very accurate in detecting malware. MaTR uses these feature sets to form classifier
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models that are used in a two-stage sequence. The first stage is malware detection, and
the second stage is malware classification.
Ultimately, there are three primary reasons to use MaTR as the static analysisbased malware detection engine for the spear phishing detection framework:
1) Malware type classification makes the output of the product actionable.
2) High true positive and true negative detection rates with very low false
positive and false negative detection rates compared to all other methods
of malware detection.
3) Readily available resources for research associated with MaTR at AFIT.
It is important to note the limitations of MaTR as well. MaTR is prone to the
same static analysis limitations in general. However, many of the detection-evading
techniques are manifested as feature sets of MaTR, thus making it more resilient to these
inherent limitations. Additionally, the MaTR prototype is substantially less accurate in
classifying malware into types than it is in detecting malware from non-malware.
2.5.4 Using ESCAPE for Dynamic Analysis
The ESCAPE platform is a true anomaly-based, dynamic analysis technique
designed to prevent malicious code from executing [Kim10]. The Air Force currently
uses ESCAPE in a web crawling implementation to automate the detection and collection
of malicious code that traverses the Internet. The key to its success lies in its ability to
whitelist, or sign, executable code that is known to be legitimate and subsequently track
and prevent the execution of unknown/unsigned code.
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ESCAPE is implemented as a device driver at the kernel level of the Windows
XP, Vista, and 7 operating systems. Since a device driver runs at the system level,
ESCAPE runs in Ring 0 and can thus implement kernel hooks as necessary. ESCAPE
hooks the System Service Dispatch Table (SSDT), which is a kernel structure that
contains pointers to addresses for the system services. The SSDT is used to look up the
function that handles a given system call [HoB05]. Specifically, ESCAPE hooks the
NtAllocateVirtualMemory,

NtProtectVirtualMemory,

NtMapViewOfSection,

NTCreateUserProcess, NtTerminateProcess, and NtSetInformationProcess Windows
system functions. In the SSDT, ESCAPE overwrites the pointers to these functions to
point to its hook function.
Hooking these functions allows ESCAPE to modify the memory protection
characteristics of all pages in memory that are allocated or mapped into [RuS04]. This is
due to the memory page protection argument that is passed to all six of these functions
when they are called. ESCAPE uses these hooks to force every page in memory to be
non-executable, essentially enabling hardware-based Data Execution Prevention for
every page in memory.
ESCAPE also hooks the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT), which contains
addresses to the functions that handle each interrupt, in order to hook the Page Fault
Handler [HoB05]. ESCAPE then allows pages in memory to be executed only if it has a
valid cryptographic signature. ESCAPE pre-computes the HMAC (Hash-based Message
Authentication Code) of every executable section within every file image on the system
or application under its protection. This is how ESCAPE whitelists, or signs, executable
code. This technique does assume, however, that the initial HMAC computation for all
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the executable code is performed on legitimate, known good code. Thus, ESCAPE has
the ability to detect the execution of new, unknown, or unverified code caused by an
attempt to transfer execution flow to an instruction in a page marked as non-executable.
Essentially, ESCAPE uses its kernel access and privileges to protect user-level
applications and processes from memory corruption exploits.
An additional feature ESCAPE offers is the ability to use a list of exceptions for
unsigned, non-whitelisted code that results from legitimate application functionality.
This requires a training period where the protected application is used exhaustively in
order to determine if any unsigned code attempts to run legitimately. If so, the signature
for this code can be added to an exceptions list, thereby reducing the rate of false
positives.
ESCAPE has demonstrated its effectiveness in detecting and preventing malicious
code execution resulting from Internet browsing to malicious web sites. Its first realworld use is in a virtual environment that spawns numerous web crawlers to visit known
or potentially malicious web sites. As the web crawlers visit sites, ESCAPE detects
unknown and potentially malicious code execution caused by web-borne exploit attempts
against web browsers.

Using this code and memory page whitelisting approach,

ESCAPE discovers 0-day exploits as well as known exploits without using signaturebased matching algorithms.
Although its proactive malicious code detection capability is desirable, ESCAPE
is still vulnerable to a return-to-libc attack due to the inherent nature of the attack using
only legitimately executable code.

Another potential weakness of ESCAPE’s code

whitelisting technique is manifested when a page in memory is marked as non-executable
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even though there is legitimate executable code present. This occurs in scenarios where
applications do not use the Windows Data Execution Prevention (DEP) feature [Dat10].
DEP helps to prevent code execution from data pages. Applications like Adobe Reader
or Flash attempt to execute legitimate code from data pages marked as non-executable by
ESCAPE. This scenario results in a false positive detection of malicious code if the
dynamically-created code is not added to ESCAPE’s exceptions list. However, the
versions of ESCAPE for Windows Vista and Windows 7 have greatly diminished the
false positive rate by preventing the most common DEP bypassing techniques.
Additionally, since ESCAPE’s malicious URL detection capability is of interest
to a system focused on spear phishing detection, a discussion on ESCAPE’s malicious
URL detection limitations is prudent. ESCAPE is susceptible to certain web crawler
prevention mechanisms by web sites not wishing to be crawled. For example, a web
page can appear to serve millions of dummy links to fool crawlers into wasting resources
by chasing down each link. This is overcome by setting a link threshold per web page
visited by the crawler. Also, a web page can cause infinite recursion or infinitely nested
links by pointing links to each other. The crawler can avoid this prevention scheme by
setting another threshold on the number of nested links to follow. A third example of an
anti-crawling mechanism is a web page causing a seemingly infinite file load time. The
web server transmits what appears to be an infinite-sized file, which is defeated by setting
a file download timeout on the crawler. Finally, if a malicious URL expects a human
user to click on a link to initiate an exploit attempt, then ESCAPE may not be able to
detect this URL as malicious. The lack of a user agent to click on active content is a
limitation. Additionally, all of these extra thresholds and limitations on the web crawler
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effectively limit the ultimate capability of the ESCAPE to access and collect information
on as many web pages as possible.
Finally, ESCAPE protects against memory corruption exploits targeting specific
application versions on specific operating systems, which are sensitive to the target
process’s memory address space layout.

Memory address space layouts change

depending on the operating system version and application version. An exploit that
works on one operating system and application version may not work on a different
version of the operating system or the application. Because of this, ESCAPE is modified
and tuned for each operating system and each application version it protects.
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III. Methodology

T

his chapter presents the methodology to design and evaluate the performance of
the SPEar phishing Attack Detection system (SPEAD). Section 3.1 addresses the

problem definition, and the goals and hypotheses are introduced in Section 3.2. The
approach and experiments to achieve the research goals are outlined in Section 3.3.
Section 3.4 provides details on how SPEAD is designed. The System Boundaries and
System Under Test (SUT) are defined in Section 3.5. The system services and workload
are discussed in Sections 3.6 and 3.7, respectively. Section 3.8 describes the performance
metrics to evaluate SPEAD. The system parameters and factors are discussed in Section
3.9 and 3.10, respectively. A detailed explanation of the evaluation technique follows in
Section 3.11, and the experimental design is highlighted in Section 3.12. Finally, the
chapter is summarized in Section 3.13.
3.1

Problem Definition
Current malware detection technology does not adequately protect organizations

or individuals from spear phishing emails that use novel, targeted, and tailored emailborne malware. The most common method of detecting email-borne malware is based on
an adaptation of host-based anti-viral techniques that search for specific signatures as
well as some heuristics of well-known email malware. However, this static signaturematching technique does not adequately prevent spear phishing attacks, which use novel
malware. An automated email analysis framework that reliably detects novel malware
will significantly limit a primary attack vector for cyber espionage.
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3.2

Goals and Hypotheses
The objective of this thesis is to develop and evaluate a framework to perform

automated analysis of emails for previously unknown malware in near real time. The
proposed system, SPEAD, identifies email transmissions on a target network, parses the
emails for web site URLs (Uniform Resource Locators) and specific file attachments,
submits these URLs and files to two malware detection engines (i.e., MaTR and
ESCAPE), and stores the malware detection results in a database. Because this research
is sponsored by an Air Force entity, design decisions are made, wherever possible, to
emulate expected behavior on an Air Force base network.
There are four goals of this research:
1) Construct an email collection and processing system that passively obtains emails,
parses them for URLs and specific file attachments, and inserts URL and file
metadata into a database for automated malware analysis.
2) Modify MaTR’s and ESCAPE’s execution environments to: 1) receive source
URLs and files from a database for analysis, and 2) update the database with the
malware detection results.
3) Collect malware detection metrics from SPEAD and from commercial email antivirus products for comparison and evaluation of SPEAD’s effectiveness.
4) Characterize and evaluate the time required (i.e., latency) to perform this
automated analysis of email file attachments and URLs under an approximated
Air Force base’s email traffic throughput.
It is hypothesized that an email collection system can be constructed that: 1)
combines two malware detection algorithms to simultaneously and synergistically
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address the other’s weaknesses and limitations, and 2) detects novel email-borne malware
at a higher rate than commodity anti-virus products. In the context of this thesis, novel
malware refers to malware or malicious code that is unknown to the general public and
cannot be found within public forums, databases, or commercial products. Because email
transmissions from client to client generally occur in a timeframe on the order of seconds
to minutes, it is also hypothesized that this system will identify the presence of malicious
emails within one hour, regardless of the sustained email traffic workload.
3.3

Approach
This section provides a cursory look into the design and evaluation approach for

SPEAD and how this approach achieves the four goals of this research. While this
section is focused on the high-level design decisions, a more detailed explanation of
SPEAD’s system design is given in Section 3.4.
The high-level view of SPEAD’s overall functionality is illustrated in Figure 1.
This figure and its explanation summarize how this approach meets the first two research
goals. SPEAD’s functionality is broken down into three phases:
1) Email Collection: emails are passively collected (i.e., out of band) from a base LAN.
2) Email Processing: emails are parsed for specific file attachments and all URLs.
3) Malware Detection: files and URLs are submitted to malware detection engines.
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Figure 1: High-level Flowchart of SPEAD Functionality

For email collection, SPEAD collects emails passively as an intentional decision
to make this spear phishing detection framework more viable for wide-scale
implementation. Within the Air Force and other large organizations, there is a general
reluctance to introduce new network infrastructure ―inline‖, meaning the infrastructure
becomes another device for network traffic to pass through before reaching its intended
destination.
For email processing, SPEAD focuses on the following file types: Windows
Portable Executable or Common Object File Format (PE/COFF), Adobe Reader, and
Microsoft PowerPoint, Excel, and Word files. These file types are selected for this
research because of their prevalence in email spear phishing attacks [Van08].
For malware detection, MaTR analyzes PE/COFF files, ESCAPE analyzes the
non-PE/COFF files (i.e., Reader, PowerPoint, Excel, and Word files), and both MaTR
and ESCAPE analyze URLs. MaTR is initially designed to perform batch processing of
PE/COFF files, and it has been extended to perform malware detection on PE/COFF files
downloaded via URLs. ESCAPE is initially implemented to perform a web crawling
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mission to detect memory corruption exploits against Internet Explorer, but it has been
extended to detect memory corruption exploits against Adobe Reader and Microsoft
PowerPoint, Excel, and Word.
The approach for achieving the third research goal involves selecting and
installing commodity anti-virus products, obtaining a malicious and non-malicious file
and URL corpus, and sending malicious and non-malicious emails to SPEAD and each of
the selected anti-virus (A/V) products.

Because it is impractical to examine all

commercial anti-virus products, five representative commodity anti-virus products are
chosen based on the following criteria:


The product has a history of performing well according to Virus Bulletin’s
rigorous anti-virus testing [Vir10].



The product offers a Microsoft Exchange Server component, which
represents a common email server for large enterprises, such as the Air
Force.



The product is competitively priced, which increases its viability as a
widely scalable solution.

The five selected products are as follows: AVG Internet Security Business
Edition, BitDefender Security for Windows Servers, G Data MailSecurity, McAfee
GroupShield for Microsoft Exchange, and Microsoft Forefront Protection 2010 for
Exchange Server. Each of these five products is installed on a Microsoft Server 2008 R2
operating system running Exchange Server 2007. Because these anti-virus products
employ static analysis-based malware detection, the choice of underlying operating
system does not affect the product’s malware detection accuracy.

40

Next, a corpus of malicious files and URLs is acquired from various sources, as
outlined in Table 1. The malicious PE/COFF, Adobe Reader, and Microsoft PowerPoint,
Excel, and Word files are acquired primarily from two sources: the VX Heavens public
malware database and two exceptionally large organizations who wish to remain
anonymous.

Additional Adobe Reader malware is obtained from the Offensive

Computing website [Off10] and directly from an industry expert in Adobe Reader
malware analysis [Dix10].

The malware collection acquired from the two large

organizations is labeled as Novel because of the organizations’ focus on protecting
against cyber espionage and their general reluctance to submit all malware to anti-virus
companies. Malware obtained from the public sources are labeled as Known to indicate
that this malware is more likely to be obtained and analyzed by anti-virus companies.

Sample
Type
Known
Novel
Total

Table 1: Malicious File and URL Corpus
Adobe Microsoft Microsoft
Microsoft
PE/COFF
Reader
Excel
Word PowerPoint
2,213
112
8
13
7
278
91
21
9
4
2,491
203
29
22
11

URLs
1,920
0
1,920

Malicious URLs are acquired from the online Malware Domain List, which
contains almost 60,000 malicious URLs, with the most recent URLs dated 6 January
2011 [Mal11]. Only the URLs submitted since the beginning of December 2010 are used
in this research due to the short lifespan of malicious URLs once they are reported. No
URLs are collected from private sources, so the entire malicious collection is considered
to be known bad.
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All malware and malicious URL samples are assumed to be malicious based on
the open-source community’s vetting of the Known malware and URLs as well as the
trusted relationship with the two anonymous organizations. Validating every malicious
file and URL through malware analysis is outside the scope of this research.
In addition to the malicious corpus of files and URLs, a collection of nonmalicious files and URLs, quantified in Table 2, are acquired from a computer securityaware graduate student’s computer. The files are reviewed by the student for the purpose
of accounting for their existence. Unfamiliar files are discarded to reduce the likelihood
of malware making its way into the non-malicious file corpus. The URLs, reviewed in a
similar fashion, are obtained from the student’s web browser ―bookmarks‖.
Table 2: Non-malicious File and URL Corpus
Adobe
Microsoft Microsoft
Microsoft
PE/COFF
URLs
Reader
Excel
Word
PowerPoint
Number of
Samples

1,787

382

100

196

170

188

Ultimately, the malicious and non-malicious file and URL corpus are inserted into
emails and used in the experiments outlined in the experimental methodology in Figure 2.
Experiment 1 determines the optimal configuration for SPEAD and is detailed in Section
3.3.1. The metrics and data collected from Experiments 2 and 3 are used to achieve the
third research goal of comparing SPEAD’s and the A/V products’ detection performance.
These two experiments are explained in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3. Finally, Section 3.3.4
describes the experiment to achieve the fourth research goal of characterizing SPEAD’s
latency.
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Figure 2: Experiments Used to Achieve Research Goals
3.3.1 Experiment #1: Find an Optimal Configuration
The first experiment seeks to determine the optimal configuration for one of
ESCAPE’s configuration parameters. ESCAPE’s malware detection is based on dynamic
analysis, and it must therefore run each file and visit each URL it is analyzing. Chapter
2, Section 2.3.2.3 outlines the limitations of dynamic analysis, one of them being the nondeterministic nature of deciding how long to wait for a process to finish its execution and
reveal its true intentions. Because of this, wait times of 5, 10, and 20 seconds are
evaluated for malware detection accuracy in three separate tests.

A sample set of

malicious files and URLs are selected based on preliminary research, where ESCAPE
detects their exploitation attempts consistently with a wait time of 30 seconds. This
sample set is delivered by email to SPEAD, and the consistency of ESCAPE’s detection

43

accuracy is evaluated for each wait time to determine the optimal configuration for
ESCAPE. These three tests are each repeated three times to ensure the metrics are
accurate to the 95% confidence level.
3.3.2 Experiment #2: Determine SPEAD Detection Accuracy
The second experiment involves sending malicious and non-malicious emails
through SPEAD in order to determine malware detection accuracy metrics.

The

malicious and non-malicious emails use the entire corpus of malicious and non-malicious
files and URLs from Tables 1 and 2. Four tests are performed using varying emails as
input: 1) emails with malicious URLs, 2) emails with malicious files, 3) emails with nonmalicious URLs, and 4) emails with non-malicious files. These four tests are segregated
to simplify the metric collection efforts, and the tests are each repeated three times to
ensure the metrics are accurate at a 95% confidence level. The metrics, explained in
Section 3.8, are used to evaluate SPEAD’s detection performance in comparison with the
commodity A/V products, discussed in the next section.

Additionally, the first two

research goals are validated by demonstrating that all the emails sent into SPEAD are
actually received and processed by SPEAD. The list of URLs processed by ESCAPE and
MaTR are compared with the list of URLs from both the malicious and non-malicious
URL corpus. Similarly, the full collection of files processed by ESCAPE and MaTR are
compared with the original corpus of malicious and non-malicious files.
3.3.3 Experiment #3: Determine Commodity A/V Detection Accuracy
The third experiment involves sending malicious and non-malicious emails
through each of the five commercial anti-virus products in order to determine their
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malware detection accuracy metrics. Just as in Experiment 2, the malicious and nonmalicious emails use the entire corpus of malicious and non-malicious files and URLs,
and four segregated tests are performed for each A/V product. These four tests are each
repeated three times to ensure the metrics are accurate at a 95% confidence level. The
metrics are used to evaluate the commodity anti-virus products’ detection performance in
comparison with SPEAD’s, thus achieving the third research goal.
3.3.4 Experiment #4: Characterize SPEAD Latency
The fourth experiment is an abbreviated version of Experiment 2, where a smaller
collection of source emails is used. However, the purpose of this experiment is to
observe the latency of SPEAD, which is the time SPEAD takes to receive an email and
make a determination on the email’s malicious intentions.

This latency metric is

collected for three tests using varying speeds of email traffic sent to SPEAD: 1) a
maximum email throughput, 2) an expected email throughput, and 3) a low email
throughput. These email throughputs are the speeds at which emails are sent, and they
are based on an approximated Air Force base’s email traffic throughput.

These

throughputs are further explained in Section 3.7. The three tests are each repeated three
times to ensure latency metrics remain precise within a 95% confidence interval. This
experiment seeks to characterize SPEAD’s latency in the context of varying email traffic
loads, thus achieving the fourth goal of this research.
3.4

System Design
This section delves into the details of the SPEAD system design. It does not

cover the details of the underlying hardware and specific software versions, which are
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explained in Section 3.11. This section is organized in the context of Figure 1, where
SPEAD’s overall functionality is illustrated in three phases: email collection, email
processing, and malware detection.
3.4.1

Email Collection

SPEAD’s email collection flowchart is shown in Figure 3, and it consists of an
email server receiving a new incoming email, adding a blind carbon copy recipient to the
list of recipients, and delivering the email to the appropriate recipient’s mailbox.

Figure 3: SPEAD’s Email Collection Flowchart

The email collection is performed on a Microsoft Exchange 2007 email server
running on a Microsoft Server 2008 R2 (Release 2) operating system. The Exchange
server is configured with the Hub Transport server role, which is the required
configuration to handle all mail flow inside an organization, including email delivery to
recipients’ mailboxes [Hub06]. A transport rule is created on this email server that is
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applied to all emails processed by this email server. This rule adds a recipient to the
incoming email by blind carbon copying the email to a specified user’s mailbox. The
specified user account belongs to SPEAD, and this effectively copies all incoming emails
to SPEAD’s mailbox.
3.4.2

Email Processing

SPEAD’s email processing flowchart is shown in Figure 4, and it consists of
downloading emails from a server-side mailbox, parsing the emails for URLs or specific
files, and disseminating these URLs, files, and their respective metadata to the malware
detection component.

Figure 4: SPEAD’s Email Processing Flowchart

The email processing is performed by three Microsoft Windows-based programs:
Microsoft Outlook, Visual Basic for Applications (VBA), and Visual Basic scripts
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(VBscripts). In the context of Figure 3, Outlook downloads the email from SPEAD’s
mailbox on the Exchange server, the Outlook VBA module determines if files or URLs
exist, and the VBscripts extract the files/URLs, inserts appropriate information into a
database, and copies files to a file share. The detailed explanation is as follows:
1) Microsoft Outlook is configured with an Exchange account for its SPEAD
mailbox on the Exchange server. As Outlook downloads new emails from the
Exchange server, an email rule is run against all new emails as they enter the
Inbox, and this rule’s purpose is to run an Outlook VBA module to process
each email.
2) The Outlook VBA module determines if any attachments or URLs exist
within the email.

The attachments are easily discovered using VBA’s

MailItem object, which represents an email message in an Inbox folder, and
the Attachments property, which references all attachments for the
specified MailItem object [Mal10]. URLs are discovered using a regular
expression pattern against which all email content is compared.
3) Upon discovering any file attachments or URLs, the VBA program spawns a
VBscript process to handle each file and each URL found in an email. For
example, if five emails are received, each with one file attachment, then five
VBscript processes are started in parallel to handle each file attachment. The
same is true if one email contained five attachments.
4) The purpose of the VBscript process is to insert the appropriate file and URL
information into a MySQL database, which serves as a catalyst to start the
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malware detection engines. The VBscript behaves according to its input, as
follows:
a. If there is a file, the VBscript determines the file type based on the
file’s binary header information. The script appends the appropriate
file extension to the file name and then moves the file to a remote file
share server.

Finally, the VBscript connects to a remote MySQL

database, where it inserts a row containing information pertinent to the
file.
b. If there is a URL, the VBscript connects to a remote MySQL database,
where it inserts a row containing information pertinent to the URL.
5) The VBscript awaits a response from the malware detection engines for the
file or URL in question. The malware detection engines update specific
MySQL columns for each file or URL being analyzed. The script tracks this
progress by polling the database at regular intervals until the appropriate
database columns have been updated for the file or URL row in question.
When the malware detection engines’ responses are detected, the script
performs a final update of its file or URL row before terminating itself. This
final update is the latency, or the time it took the malware detection engines to
provide an answer.

Latency is calculated using VBscript’s native timer

function, which is accurate to the second. A timestamp is taken when an
email is received, and another timestamp is taken immediately after a response
is received from the malware detection engines. The difference between these
timestamps is the latency in seconds.
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3.4.3

Malware Detection

SPEAD’s malware detection flowchart is shown in Figure 5, and it consists of two
malware detection algorithms, MaTR and ESCAPE, polling a database for files and
URLs to be analyzed and performing malware analysis on these files and URLs.

Figure 5: SPEAD’s Malware Detection Flowchart

The malware detection is performed by Windows-based MaTR and ESCAPE
clients. In the context of Figure 4, the MaTR client polls the database and performs its
malware detection algorithm when a PE/COFF file or a URL needs to be analyzed.
Similarly, the ESCAPE client polls the database and performs its malware detection
algorithm when a non-PE/COFF file or a URL needs to be analyzed. The database is
updated with the results of MaTR’s and/or ESCAPE’s analysis. The details of MaTR’s
and ESCAPE’s roles in malware detection are given in the following sections.
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3.4.3.1 MaTR’s Role in Malware Detection
The MaTR algorithm is implemented as a command line utility running on a
Windows operating system, and it is designed to receive PE/COFF files as input. This
Windows client also runs VBscripts to handle the file/URL input from the database as
well as the analysis results from MaTR, as follows:
1) Multiple MaTR processes are running in parallel on the Windows client to
simultaneously analyze PE/COFF files from email attachments and PE/COFF
files downloaded via URLs. The results of analysis are recorded in a local log
file.
2) Multiple VBscript processes are running in parallel on the Windows client to
simultaneously handle PE/COFF files and URLs from the remote MySQL
database. If a PE/COFF file is being analyzed, the file is first copied to the
local hard drive from the remote file share. If a URL is being analyzed, a file
is downloaded from the URL and its file type is determined. Non-PE/COFF
files are ignored. When MaTR finishes its analysis, these scripts read the
appropriate log file and update the MySQL database with the malware
detection results for the appropriate file or URL.
3.4.3.2 ESCAPE’s Role in Malware Detection
ESCAPE is implemented as a 32 bit Windows driver installed on four unique
Windows clients, as shown in Table 3. These ESCAPE clients all have Adobe Reader,
Internet Explorer, and Microsoft Office installed in order to analyze the four non-
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PE/COFF file types. The justification for selecting these specific system parameters is
explained in Section 3.9.
Table 3: Four ESCAPE Client Configurations
Adobe
Internet
Microsoft
Windows
Reader
Explorer
Office
Version
Version
Version
Version
8.0
7.0
2007
XP SP2
8.0
7.0
2007
Vista (no SP)
9.0
8.0
2007
Vista SP1
9.0
8.0
2007
Windows 7

Furthermore, four copies exist for each of these four configurations. These 16
ESCAPE clients allow for parallel analysis of files and URLs, which is needed to speed
up the inherently slow nature of dynamic malware analysis. The number of ESCAPE
clients can be extended arbitrarily, but 16 clients are selected to adequately demonstrate
scalability of the ESCAPE clients while staying within the limits of the underlying
hardware described in Section 3.11. These ESCAPE clients run Python scripts to handle
the file/URL input from the database as well as the response from ESCAPE, as follows:
1) Eight ESCAPE clients are running Python scripts to poll the remote MySQL
database for non-PE/COFF files to be analyzed. If such a file is ready for
analysis, the Python script copies the file from the remote file share to the
local disk before opening the file. ESCAPE monitors the execution of the
parent application and records its analysis results in a log file. The script
reads the log file and updates the MySQL database with the malware detection
results for the appropriate file.
2) Eight ESCAPE clients are running Python scripts to poll the remote MySQL
database for URLs to be analyzed. If a URL is ready for analysis, the Python

52

script launches Internet Explorer to visit the web page. ESCAPE monitors the
execution of Internet Explorer and records its analysis results in a log file.
The script reads the log file and updates the MySQL database with the
malware detection results for the appropriate URL.
An additional feature of ESCAPE that is not evaluated in this research effort is its
ability to capture a memory dump of the offending process’s address space when
malicious code is detected. This memory dump is stored on the file share for further
analysis as needed.
3.5

System boundaries
The System Under Test (SUT) is the SPEar phishing Attack Detection (SPEAD)

system shown in Figure 6.

SPEAD consists of the following components:

email

collection, email processing, file sharing, malware detection database, and the malware
detection engine. The Component Under Test (CUT) is the malware detection engine,
which consists of two subcomponents: ESCAPE and MaTR.

Figure 6: Spear Phishing Attack Detection System
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Workload parameters include emails with malicious and non-malicious file
attachments, emails with malicious and non-malicious URLs, and the email throughput,
which is measured in number of attachments per minute and number of URLs per minute.
The workload parameters are discussed in more detail in Section 3.7.

The system

parameters consist of the software used by the email collection, email processing, file
sharing, and malware detection database components. It also includes ESCAPE’s and
MaTR’s configurations. The system parameters are discussed in more detail in Section
3.9. The metrics of the system consist of the true positive malware detection rate, the
false positive malware detection rate, and the latency in determining if an email is
malicious or not. These metrics are clarified in Section 3.8.
Because Experiment 3 does not use SPEAD, only certain portions of the SUT in
Figure 6 apply, such as the workload and the metrics. Specifically, the true positive and
false positive detection rates, and not the latency, are collected for Experiment 3.
3.6

System Services
SPEAD provides a malicious email detection service for email servers on local

area network gateways to the Internet. The service is successful if the system identifies
an email containing a malicious file attachment or URL within an hour to allow for near
real time mitigation. SPEAD fails if it incorrectly identifies a malicious email as benign
or a benign email as malicious. In addition, failure occurs if SPEAD’s latency is greater
than one hour.

54

3.7

Workload
The workload submitted to SPEAD consists of emails sent to an email server that

vary in three ways: 1) the presence of a file attachment, 2) the presence of a URL, and 3)
the speed at which the emails are sent. Every email used in the four experiments contains
exactly one file attachment or one URL within the email body. These files and URLs are
pulled from the malicious and non-malicious file and URL corpus.
The speeds at which the emails are sent (i.e., email throughput), are varied only
for Experiment 4. Experiments 1, 2, and 3 use the maximum email throughput offered by
this experimental setup in order to achieve those experiments with efficient use of time.
Email throughput is varied between low, expected, and maximum throughput for
Experiment 4 by changing the email sending function on the email sending system. The
details of the email sending system are provided in Section 3.11.
The low and expected email throughputs are based on the email statistics from
Table 4. The statistics are a summary of a one-week observational study of a large Air
Force base’s incoming and outgoing emails.

The expected email throughput is an

estimate of the number of emails with attachments or URLs that SPEAD would be
expected to process at a sustained rate at a large Air Force base.

This expected

throughput is calculated using the one-day maximums over an 8-hour period to
approximate peak email usage during a typical work day. The expected email throughput
is calculated to be approximately 53 attachments and 1,111 URLs per minute. Because
this expected throughput is an estimate, round numbers are used for clarity and to ease
the configuration of the email sending system. Thus, this experiment uses an expected
email throughput of 60 attachments and 1,000 URLs per minute.
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Table 4: Email Statistics from One-week Observation of an Air Force Base
Attachments
URLs
132,656
2,873,076
7-Day Total
25,288
533,363
1-Day Maximum

The low email throughput is based on the overall weekly average, and it is a
conservative estimate of the sustained email throughput for non-peak usage. The low
email throughput is calculated to be approximately 11 attachments and 249 URLs per
minute. Again, more convenient numbers are chosen to aid in configuring the email
sending system. This experiment uses a low throughput of 12 attachments and 240 URLs
per minute.
The maximum throughput is based on preliminary testing of the email sending
system’s maximum email throughput.

This maximum observed throughput is

approximately 232 attachments and 1,422 URLs per minute. This experiment uses an
estimated maximum throughput of 300 attachments and 1,500 URLs per minute.
3.8

Performance Metrics
System performance is measured in terms of malicious email detection accuracy

rates as well as the latency introduced by SPEAD. The following performance metrics
are defined:
True Positive Rate: The percentage of malicious emails identified as malicious by
SPEAD. This metric is measured by observing SPEAD’s response to each malicious
email. If every malicious email is identified as such, the true positive rate is 100%. The
false negative rate, which is the percentage of malicious emails identified as legitimate, is
deduced from the true positive rate since the sum of the true positive and false negative
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rates is 100%. The true positive rate metric is also measured for the five commodity antivirus products.
False Positive Rate:

The percentage of non-malicious emails identified as

malicious by SPEAD. This metric is measured by observing SPEAD’s response to each
non-malicious email. If every non-malicious email is detected as malicious, the false
positive rate is 100%. The true negative rate, which is the percentage of non-malicious
emails identified as legitimate, is deduced from the false positive rate since the sum of the
false positive and true negative rates is 100%. The false positive metric is also measured
for the five commodity anti-virus products.
Latency: The amount of time it takes an email to propagate through SPEAD.
Latency is measured by subtracting the time of the CUT decision determination from the
time when SPEAD received the incoming email at the email collector component, as
discussed in Section 3.4.2. The latency metric characterizes the maximum and average
time delay in SPEAD’s determination of an email’s malicious intent.

This metric

determines the success of SPEAD at meeting the secondary experimental goal of
providing a near real time response.
3.9

System Parameters
System parameters are the properties of SPEAD which, when changed, affect the

performance of the system. Figure 6 lists the system parameters, which are defined as
follows:


Email Collection Software: The email collection component of SPEAD uses the
Microsoft Exchange 2007 email server running on a Microsoft Server 2008 R2
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(Release 2) operating system. Server 2008 R2 is Microsoft’s newest server operating
system. Exchange 2007 is selected because of its common use in the Air Force. The
latest version, Exchange 2010, is considered, but a license cannot be obtained in the
timeframe of this research. Regardless, both Exchange 2007 and 2010 have the Hub
Transport Server Role, which is used to set up a Transport Rule to blind carbon copy
the SPEAD mailbox on the server. Other types of email servers are not considered
because of the Air Force-focused nature of this experimental setup. Therefore, this
system parameter is fixed.


Email Processing Software:

The email processing component of SPEAD uses

Microsoft Outlook, VBA programs, and VBscript. Microsoft Outlook is selected as
the email client for SPEAD because it is ubiquitous across the Air Force network as
the email client of choice, and it is assumed that spear phishing attacks against the Air
Force are designed to be successful with Outlook as the email client. VBA and
VBscripts are selected because of their inherent interoperability with Windows
applications such as Outlook. This system parameter is fixed, but the correctness of
the VBA and VBscript code is validated as a part of Experiment 2 because this is
original code created for SPEAD.


Malware Detection Database Software: The malware detection database component
of SPEAD uses the MySQL database. MySQL is selected because of its proven
capabilities for high availability, high performance, scalability, flexibility, and robust
transactional support [Top10].

MySQL uses the InnoDB storage engine for

transactional support, which allows for unlimited row-level locking [The10]. This
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storage engine is crucial for a multi-user concurrency environment such as SPEAD’s
environment. This system parameter is fixed.


File Sharing Software: The file sharing component of SPEAD uses the Samba
service installed on the same Linux platform as SPEAD’s malware detection database
component.

Samba is an open source software suite that provides file sharing

services to SMB (Server Message Block) clients [Wha10]. SMB is the service
Windows clients use for file sharing. Because the email processing and malware
detection engine components of SPEAD use Windows, Samba is selected. This
system parameter is fixed.


MaTR Configuration: The CUT uses MaTR as half of its malware detection engine.
MaTR’s malware detection algorithm uses a decision tree classifier model for
malware type classification [DRP+10]. While a different classifier certainly affects
the malware detection accuracy, varying this parameter is outside the scope of this
thesis.

The MaTR prototype is used for this SPEAD prototype.

Furthermore,

because MaTR analyzes 32 bit Windows Portable Executable and Common Object
File Format (PE/COFF) files, it needs a Windows operating system. Thus, the MaTR
command line utility runs on the Windows 7 operating system. VBscripts are used as
the communication conduit between the MaTR utility and the malware detection
database because VBscripts provide convenient functionality with Windows-based
applications. Thus, this system parameter is fixed.


ESCAPE Configuration: The CUT uses ESCAPE as half of its malware detection
engine.

ESCAPE’s malware detection algorithm is based on dynamic analysis.

Section 3.3.1 describes Experiment 1 and its purpose, which is to establish a
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sufficient wait time for a process to finish its execution and reveal its true intentions.
Section 4.1 discusses the results of Experiment 1. After Experiment 1, this portion of
the ESCAPE Configuration system parameter is fixed and used for Experiments 2 and
4.
Table 3 in Section 3.4.3.2 outlines the four configurations used by the ESCAPE
clients. In order to understand why these specific operating system and application
versions are selected, it is important to remember that ESCAPE is modified and tuned for
each operating system and each application version it protects. Thus, it only detects
memory corruption exploits that would have been successful against the operating system
and application version ESCAPE is protecting. The selection of the specific operating
systems and application versions in Table 3 are a result of a balanced look at two
opposing thought processes:
1) When SPEAD operates on a real-world network, the latest operating system
and application versions are likely to be employed. To emulate this reality,
the latest operating system and application versions must be considered for
this research.
2) Because new exploits against the latest operating system (O/S) and application
versions are inherently difficult to obtain due to the fact that they are unknown
until they are known, older operating systems and application versions must
be considered for the sake of experimentation and evaluation of SPEAD’s
effectiveness in a research environment. To this same end, multiple O/S and
application versions must be considered to widen the detection aperture for
ESCAPE.
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The latter thought process drives more of the reasoning behind the selection of the
four specific ESCAPE client configurations. The current Adobe Reader version is not
tested due to the difficulty in obtaining exploits against it. Thus, version 8.0 and 9.0 are
selected. Table 3 also shows that Microsoft Windows XP, Vista, and 7 are selected
because of their current and future use in the Air Force [Ken10]. Internet Explorer 7.0
and 8.0 and Microsoft Office 2007 are selected because of their ubiquitous use on the
selected operating systems. All selected operating systems and applications, with the
exception of XP and one of the Vista configurations, are unpatched to allow for as many
application vulnerabilities as possible for the sake of evaluating SPEAD’s
implementation of ESCAPE against obtainable malware. Windows XP requires Service
Pack 2 (SP2) to run Internet Explorer 7.0, and Vista requires SP1 to run Internet Explorer
8.0.
3.10

Factors
This section describes the factors that are varied during the experiments. Table 5

shows these factors and their associated levels. These factors are selected from the
SUT’s workload and system parameters. Each of the four experiments uses a portion of
these factors and their levels.
Table 5: Factor Levels for the Experiments
Factor
Level 1
Level 2
Emails with Attachments
Emails with URLs
Email Throughput
ESCAPE Configuration

Malicious
Malicious
Maximum
Wait 5 sec
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Non-malicious
Non-malicious
Expected
Wait 10 sec

Level 3

Low
Wait 20 sec

Experiment 1 focuses on ESCAPE’s configuration.

Thus, all factors are

controlled at the Level 1 factor level with the exception of the ESCAPE Configuration
system parameter, where all three factor levels are used. Malicious attachments and
URLs are used at a maximum email throughput to measure ESCAPE’s malware detection
configuration in a time-efficient manner.
Experiments 2 and 3 focus on SPEAD’s and the commercial anti-virus products’
malware detection metrics. Thus, emails with attachments and emails with URLs are
varied according to their factor levels. The email throughput factor is controlled at the
maximum level to complete the experiments in a time-efficient manner. Experiment 2
also uses a controlled ESCAPE Configuration factor level that is determined from
Experiment 1. Experiment 3 does not use the ESCAPE Configuration factor because
SPEAD is not a part of this experiment.
Experiment 4 focuses on the latency metric of SPEAD across varying email
throughputs.

A sample subset of malicious and non-malicious files and URLs is

randomly selected for each of the three email throughput latency tests. The selection of
this sample set is clarified in Section 4.3. Thus, only the email throughput factor is
varied. This experiment uses a controlled ESCAPE Configuration factor level that is
determined from Experiment 1.
3.11

Evaluation Technique
The experiments use a direct measurement-based evaluation technique to

determine SPEAD’s performance by recording measurements while the system is
operating. There are many reasons to pursue this evaluation technique over simulation-
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based or analytic modeling-based techniques.

Namely, the MaTR and ESCAPE

frameworks are already established and can be integrated into this new system. Also, all
network activity takes place in a controlled laboratory environment.

Because the

environment is controlled, the accuracy afforded by this measurement-based evaluation is
high and more realistic than a simulation-based or analytic modeling-based evaluation.
Lastly, the higher cost typically associated with measurement-based evaluations is
fulfilled by sponsor funding for this research effort.
The experimental setup is illustrated in Figure 7. It shows that the experiments
are initiated from an email sender system. The email sending system crafts and sends one
email at a time to an arbitrary email account on the Microsoft Exchange server. Since
this email server is the email collection component for SPEAD, all emails are copied to
SPEAD’s mailbox on the server. This is required for Experiments 1, 2, and 4.

Figure 7: Experimental Setup
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The email server also doubles as the server upon which the commercial anti-virus
products are installed for Experiment 3.

Virtual machine snapshots are used to

differentiate between operating configurations for this email server, and additional details
are given in the rest of this section.
The experiment environment consists of a collection of hardware and software
dedicated to this research effort.

The experimental setup consists of the following

components:


Two Dell PowerEdge R610 servers with 64GB of memory, dual six-core Intel Xeon
processors at 2.93GHz, four Ethernet ports, and 1TB of storage each. These servers
run all of SPEAD’s software for the experiments via virtual machines running on top
of the ESX 4.1 operating system. These servers are referenced below as ESX Server
1 and ESX Server 2 for clarity.



One email sending system running on an Ubuntu Linux 9.10 (64 bit) virtual machine
image on ESX Server 1. This image has Postfix version 2.6.5 installed, which is an
open source email server package for Linux. Mutt version 1.5.20 is installed as the
email client, which is responsible for sending the email workload for the experiments.
This image is configured with four virtual processors, 16GB of RAM, and one virtual
Ethernet adapter.



One email collection system running on Microsoft Server 2008 R2 with Exchange
Server 2007 SP1 loaded as a virtual machine image on ESX Server 1. This image has
six snapshots. One snapshot is saved as the baseline email server that SPEAD uses
for its email collection component.

Five snapshots are saved for each of the

following five installed anti-virus products: AVG Internet Security Business Edition

64

9.0, BitDefender Security for Windows Servers version 3.0, G Data MailSecurity,
McAfee GroupShield version 7.0.1 for Microsoft Exchange, and Microsoft Forefront
Protection 2010 for Exchange Server. This image is configured with two virtual
processors, 4GB of RAM, and one virtual Ethernet adapter.


One email processing system running on a Windows 7 (64 bit) virtual machine image
on ESX Server 1. This image has Microsoft Office 2007 installed, the MySQL
Connector/ODBC 5.1.8 driver (Open Database Connectivity), and the following open
source command line utilities: Fourmilab’s MD5 version 2.2 program and the
GnuWin32 File version 5.03 program. This system has the default references for the
Outlook Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) editor in addition to the following:
ActiveX Data Objects 6.0 Library and VBScript Regular Expressions 5.5. This
image is configured with four virtual processors, 16GB of RAM, and one virtual
Ethernet adapter.



One malware detection database running on an Ubuntu Linux Server 10.04.1 (64 bit)
virtual machine image on ESX Server 1. This image has MySQL 5.1.41 and Samba
3.4.7 services installed. This image is configured with four virtual processors, 30GB
of RAM, and one virtual Ethernet adapter.



16 ESCAPE clients running various versions of Windows virtual machine images on
ESX Server 2. These images are the four clones of each of the four ESCAPE
configurations outlined in Table 3. The XP images are configured with one processor
and 1GB of RAM while the others have 2GB of RAM. All 16 images have PyWin32
version 2.6 installed, which is a Python Win32 extension for Windows. Each image
has one virtual Ethernet adapter connected to the Internet.
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One MaTR client running on a Windows 7 (64 bit) virtual machine image on ESX
Server 2. This image uses two virtual processors, 4GB of RAM, and one virtual
Ethernet adapter.

3.12

Experimental Design
The four experiments each use a partial-factorial design with factors and levels

selected from Table 5. There are a total of 90 tests required to accomplish all four
experiments. These tests are calculated as follows:


Experiment 1 3 ESCAPE configurations * 3 repetitions = 9



Experiment 2 2 email types * 2 levels * 3 repetitions = 12



Experiment 3 2 email types * 2 levels * 5 A/V products * 3 repetitions = 60



Experiment 4 3 email throughput levels * 3 repetitions = 9
Each experiment is replicated three times to confirm the resulting metrics at a

95% confidence level.
3.13

Methodology Summary
This chapter discusses the methodology used to evaluate the performance of an

email spear phishing detection system. The four goals of this research or introduced, and
the approach and experiments to accomplish these goals are described. The system’s
design, boundaries, services, workload, and parameters are provided in detail.
Performance is evaluated using a measurement-based technique and is based on three
performance metrics: true positive rate, false negative rate, and latency.

A partial-

factorial experimental design is replicated three times for each experiment for a total of
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90 tests. Analysis of the results of these tests is used to evaluate the impact of varying
the workload and system parameters on overall system performance.
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IV.

T

Results and Analysis

his chapter presents and analyzes the experimental results from the four
experiments. First, the results of Experiment 1 are explained in Section 4.1.

Next, Section 4.2 provides an analysis of the metrics collected from Experiments 2 and 3
to characterize SPEAD’s effectiveness.

Section 4.3 quantifies SPEAD’s latency

performance using Experiment 4 results.

Finally, the chapter is concluded and

summarized in Section 4.4.
4.1

Results and Analysis of Experiment 1
This experiment’s purpose is to vary ESCAPE’s configuration across three tests

to determine which configuration is optimal for accurate malware detection and speed of
analysis in terms of only the wait time factor. The time ESCAPE waits for a process to
execute or a web site to load is varied between 5, 10, and 20 seconds. A sample set of 15
malicious files and 10 URLs is selected based on preliminary tests, which show
consistent ESCAPE responses for these files and URLs. These files and URLs are sent to
SPEAD from the email sending system at the maximum throughput. It is important to
note that many malicious web sites do not attempt to exploit the same IP (Internet
Protocol) address multiple times in a short timeframe to keep automated malware
collection devices from collecting their malware. Because of this possibility, this test is
repeated two more times on different days to reduce the likelihood of skewed results.
The file results of this experiment are shown in Table 6.

The analysis for

ESCAPE’s file wait time configuration is straightforward. With the exception of the 5second wait time in Test 1, all other tests and configurations correctly detect all 15 files
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as malicious. Because the 20-second wait time offers no apparent benefit, the 10-second
wait time is chosen for ESCAPE’s file wait time for SPEAD.
Table 6: Results of File Tests for ESCAPE Wait Times
Wait Time
5 sec
10 sec
20 sec

Files Detected as Malicious
Test 1
Test 2
Test 3
12
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15

The URL results for this experiment are illustrated in Figure 8. The 10-second
wait time shows the outright best or tied for best performance in all three tests, with a
maximum of seven out of the ten malicious URLs detected correctly. It is noteworthy
that the 5-second wait time detected one more malicious URL than the 20-second wait
time in Test 1, which is counterintuitive. This may be a manifestation of a few of the
web sites withholding their exploits after seeing the same IP address twice in a short
period.

Figure 8: Results of URL Tests for ESCAPE Wait Times
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Because of the results of Experiment 1, ESCAPE’s wait time for files and URLs
is configured for 10 seconds. This SPEAD system parameter is fixed for the remaining
experiments, and it represents an optimal wait time configuration only.

Other

fundamental aspects of ESCAPE’s execution environment are not evaluated for optimal
configuration, and this is the subject of future work.
4.2

Results and Analysis of Experiments 2 and 3
This section first discusses the validation of SPEAD’s design. Then, the file-

based detection metrics are analyzed. This section is concluded with an analysis of the
URL detection metrics.
4.2.1 Validation of SPEAD’s Design
As discussed in Section 3.3.2, the files and URLs processed by MaTR and
ESCAPE during Experiment 2 are compared with the original files and URLs from the
corpus. Figure 9 shows a collage of screenshots illustrating the validation technique used
for the files. SPEAD stores all of these files on the file share on the malware detection
database for processing by ESCAPE and MaTR. The Linux program md5deep is used to
calculate the MD5 (Message-Digest Algorithm 5) hashes of the file corpus on the email
sending system.

These unique hashes are compared to the MD5 hashes of all the

analyzed files stored on the file share. Figure 9 also shows two red underlined Linux
commands. The -x <comparison file> option for md5deep tells the program to
compare every newly calculated hash to the list of hashes in the comparison file and
output any non-matches. This command results in no non-matches. Conversely, the –m
<comparison file> option tells md5deep to output all matches, of which there are
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exactly 5,391. This is the total number of files in the file corpus. The red rectangles in
Figure 9 verify that all 5,391 files are processed from the email sending system to the
email processing system and, ultimately, to the malware detection database.

Figure 9: Collage of Screenshots Showing SPEAD File Processing Validation

This MD5 calculation and comparison is made after each of the three iterations of
Experiment 2, and the MD5 hash values for the files match every time.

This is

conclusive evidence that SPEAD correctly recognizes and parses file attachments from
emails, validating this portion of the original code written for the email processing
component of SPEAD.
The URLs are validated in a similar fashion, but Figure 10 shows a URL that
SPEAD processed that it is not intended to analyze. The MD5 hash calculated for the list
of all malicious and non-malicious URLs from the URL corpus do not match the hash of
the list of URLs in the database. Thus, the application Notepad++, a source code editor
and Notepad replacement, is used to perform a visual comparison of the list of URLs sent
and the list in the database. There is only one discrepancy, shown in Figure 10 with the

71

red minus sign next to it. This URL is from the collection of clean URLs, which has been
exported into a file from a graduate student’s web browser bookmarks. The email
sending system uses this file of exported bookmarks in its original format (i.e., URLs are
tagged with metadata). Because of this, the following bookmark is processed:
<DT><A HREF=“[intended URL]” ADD_DATE="1292535624"
ICON=" <snipped> Ff"
>About.com: http://www.state.ma.us/dor</A>
The yellow highlight shows a text description for this bookmark that contains a URL
within it.

Figure 10: Screenshot of URL Mismatch

This URL is removed from the list in order to perform another MD5 hash
comparison, shown in Figure 11. The hashes for the two lists match, which validate that
only one URL is mismatched.

This URL mismatch appears to be inconsequential

considering it is SPEAD’s purpose to recognize web site links within emails. Further
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testing with real-world emails may reveal flaws in SPEAD’s URL processing algorithm,
if any. This is discussed as an area for future research in Section 5.3.

Figure 11: Screenshot Showing SPEAD’s URL Processing Validation
The results of this experiment provide convincing evidence that SPEAD correctly
recognizes and parses file attachments and URLs from emails, validating the original
code written for the email processing component of SPEAD.
4.2.2 Comparing File Detection Metrics
This section contains the true and false positive detection metrics and the analysis
of these metrics for SPEAD and the five commodity anti-virus (A/V) products. The
overall file detection metrics for SPEAD and the five A/V products are shown in Table 7.
These metrics are the mean detection accuracies across three tests for each platform. The
green highlights indicate which system had the highest true positive detection rate for
each file type. The yellow highlights indicate which systems detected false positives,
meaning the systems label a file as malicious when it is not malicious. Section 4.2.2.1
discusses the PE/COFF metrics, followed by Sections 4.2.2.2 – 4.2.2.5, which analyze the
non-PE/COFF metrics.
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Table 7: Comparison of Overall Detection Metrics for Files
PE/COFF
System

SPEAD
Forefront
G Data
BitDefender
McAfee
AVG

Reader

Excel

Word

PowerPoint

True + False + True + False + True + False + True + False + True + False +
Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
99.68
95.06
94.82
93.06
90.29
93.59

0.39
0.36
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

68.35
87.19
75.37
84.73
42.89
65.02

0.96
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

67.82
100.00
51.72
17.24
79.31
20.69

0.67
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

13.64
95.45
81.82
31.82
68.18
45.45

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
81.82
81.82
81.82
54.55
54.55

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

The detection metrics are further organized into 2x2 tables of counts of total
malware detected and not detected in each test, as shown in the example in Table 8. This
allows for Fisher’s Exact Test (FET) to be used to calculate p-values for the difference in
sample proportions. FET is the ―gold standard‖ of testing tools for 2x2 tables because of
its calculation of a p-value that requires no approximation [RaS02]. Furthermore, FET is
appropriate for any sample size and for the test of equal population odds. Both of these
facts are relevant to the analysis in this chapter due to the relatively small sample sizes of
Microsoft Excel, PowerPoint, and Word malware as well as the use of the odds ratio to
compare novel and known malware detection rates. The R statistical application [Rpr11]
is used to calculate the FET p-values for this thesis chapter.
Table 8: Example 2x2 Table for SPEAD Detection Metrics
SPEAD Detecting PE/COFF Malware
Malware
Detected
Not
Known
2,210
3
Novel
273
5

The p-value of any particular test is the measure of the credibility of the null
hypothesis, which is the hypothesis that the means of the data being tested are equal. If
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two data sets are truly equal, the null hypothesis is confirmed. The p-value is the
probability that random sampling of the data population distribution could achieve the
same result reported in the test. Thus, Figure 12 is a guide for interpreting p-values. A
very small p-value, such as 0.005, is usually an indicator that there is strong evidence for
the null hypothesis being incorrect. This means the probability that random sampling
could achieve the same result is very small, and it is convincing evidence the test result is
not due to chance (i.e., the two data sets’ means are different). FET uses a two-sided pvalue, which allows for the difference in means to be positive or negative. Thus, all pvalues reported in this chapter for tests of equal population odds are two-sided.

Figure 12: p-Value Interpretation Scale [RaS02]
4.2.2.1 PE/COFF Malware Detection Results
As shown in Table 7, SPEAD’s PE/COFF true positive detection rate is clearly
the highest, thanks to MaTR’s remarkable PE/COFF malware detection algorithm.
Because Table 7 reports the mean detection accuracies across three tests, it is important
to determine if SPEAD’s PE/COFF detection accuracy is truly different from the other
platforms’. Tukey’s HSD (Honest Significant Difference) Method is used to test all
possible pairwise differences in means to determine if at least one of these differences is
significantly different from zero at a 95% confidence level. Figure 13 illustrates this
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comparison. The six systems are labeled 1 through 6, with SPEAD being 1. Visual
inspection, highlighted by the red box, shows that SPEAD’s mean detection accuracy
compared to the others’ is significantly different from zero (i.e., dashed vertical line).
The p-values for each of SPEAD’s comparisons is too small to be reported by R, which is
conclusive evidence that SPEAD’s higher-performing PE/COFF true positive detection
accuracy is not the same (i.e., it is different) at a statistically significant level.

Figure 13: Comparison of Differences in Means of PE/COFF Detection Accuracies for
SPEAD versus Others
In terms of the false positive metric, most of the systems do not have any trouble
correctly labeling the non-malicious files across all files types in the corpus. Only
SPEAD and Forefront record any false positives. This is understandable for malware
detection algorithms that attain significantly high true positive rates. It appears that
SPEAD’s and Forefront’s detection algorithms seek to encompass more generic
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heuristics of malicious PE/COFF files, as indicated by their achieving the highest true
positive rates for PE/COFF files.
Naturally, there is value in quantifying the significance of the difference between
SPEAD’s and the others’ true positive detection rates.

Thus, a comparison of the

statistical odds of detection between SPEAD and the next best performer, Forefront,
reveals that SPEAD’s performance may be preferable. The odds for SPEAD correctly
detecting a malicious PE/COFF file is 310.4:1. This is calculated by dividing the number
of malicious PE/COFF files not detected (8) by the number correctly detected (2,483).
Forefront’s odds for correctly detecting a malicious PE/COFF file are 19.3:1. Thus, the
odds of SPEAD correctly detecting a malicious PE/COFF file are 16.1 times as large as
the odds for Forefront correctly making the same determination, with a 95% confidence
interval of 7.87 to 33.03. Also, Fisher’s Exact Test (FET) for the difference in sample
proportions results in a two-sided p-value less than 2.2e-16, providing strong evidence
that SPEAD’s and Forefront’s true positive detection proportions are different (i.e., the
ratio is not 1:1) at a statistically significant level.
The same odds ratio comparison is used to determine that SPEAD is 1.2 times
more likely to detect a non-malicious file as malicious when compared to Forefront, with
a confidence interval of 0.39 to 3.48 and a FET p-value of 1. This very high p-value
indicates a high probability that the difference between SPEAD’s and Forefront’s false
positive rates can be attributable to chance. Therefore, the evidence strongly supports the
notion that SPEAD’s overall PE/COFF detection performance may be preferable when
compared to Forefront’s when a similar malware population is evaluated.
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Even though SPEAD performs PE/COFF malware detection well, the overall
detection metrics from Table 7 do not bode well for SPEAD’s direct comparison against
the five commodity A/V products. A cursory visual inspection of these metrics show that
SPEAD ranks fourth, third, sixth, and sixth out of the six systems in terms of true positive
rates, respectively, for Adobe Reader, Microsoft Excel, Word, and PowerPoint files. This
cursory analysis leads to the conclusion that SPEAD may underperform if it is used as an
anti-virus replacement for email servers.
However, the focus of this research is on spear phishing detection, which greatly
depends on the system’s ability to detect novel malware. Because of this research focus,
additional analysis is needed in terms of novel malware detection versus known malware
detection.
Table 9 summarizes the PE/COFF malware detection metrics in the context of
novel and known malware. As discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.2, the term novel
malware refers to malware or malicious code that is unknown to the general public and
cannot be found within public forums, databases, or commercial products. The malicious
file corpus has been segregated according to Table 1.
Table 9: PE/COFF Detection Results for Novel and Known Malware

System

SPEAD
Forefront
G Data
BitDefender
McAfee
AVG

Novel
Detection
Accuracy
(%)
98.20
56.47
53.96
42.09
27.70
46.04
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PE/COFF
False
Known
Detection Positive
Rate
Accuracy
(%)
(%)
99.86
0.39
99.91
0.36
99.95
0.00
99.46
0.00
98.15
0.00
99.56
0.00

The odds of SPEAD detecting novel PE/COFF malware is 42.1 times as large as
the odds of Forefront, the next best performer, detecting the same. This is with a 95%
confidence interval of 16.84 to 105.14 and a FET two-sided p-value less than 2.2e-16,
which is conclusive evidence to support this large discrepancy in odds. The relatively
wide range of the confidence interval for the odds ratio is the result of a large standard
error. The standard error for an odds ratio is calculated by taking the square root of the
sum of the reciprocals of the four cell counts in a 2x2 table [RaS02], like that shown in
Table 8. SPEAD detects 273 of the 278 novel PE/COFF malware samples, leaving only
5 undetected. This small count (5) causes the standard error to be large because its
reciprocal is used.

In summary, SPEAD’s detection accuracy for novel PE/COFF

malware is significantly higher than the commodity anti-virus products in this
experiment. This characteristic is very conducive to SPEAD’s mission of detecting novel
malware in email spear phishing attacks.
4.2.2.2 Adobe Reader Malware Detection Results
Table 10 summarizes the Adobe Reader malware detection metrics in the context
of known and novel malware. Superficial analysis of SPEAD’s novel malware detection
rate indicates it is comparable to the commodity A/V products’ rates, with less than two
percentage points separating the top four performers.
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Table 10: Adobe Reader Detection Results for Novel and Known Malware

System

SPEAD
Forefront
G Data
BitDefender
McAfee
AVG

Adobe Reader
False
Novel
Known
Detection Detection Positive
Rate
Accuracy Accuracy
(%)
(%)
(%)
88.79
90.11
89.01
89.01
41.76
72.16

51.74
84.82
64.29
81.25
43.75
59.45

0.96
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

To confirm this cursory analysis, a more in-depth analysis of the differences in
means for the novel malware detection accuracies is shown in Figure 14. Tukey’s HSD
Method to test the differences in means is used to illustrate this point at a 95% confidence
level. The pairwise comparisons indicate that the differences in means for SPEAD –
Forefront, SPEAD – G Data, and SPEAD – BitDefender are not significantly different
from zero because their confidence intervals include zero, and the p-values for each
comparison are greater than 0.999. This means SPEAD’s, Forefront’s, G Data’s, and
BitDefender’s novel Adobe Reader malware detection accuracies are very similar at a
statistically significant level. This is confirmation that SPEAD’s novel Adobe Reader
malware detection rate is comparable to the best of the commodity A/V products in this
experiment.
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Figure 14: Comparison of Differences in Means of Adobe Reader Novel Malware
Detection Accuracies for SPEAD versus Others
Furthermore, this data is viewed from one more angle. A close examination of
Table 10 reveals a large discrepancy between SPEAD’s novel and its known malware
detection accuracies in comparison to the A/V systems’ discrepancies. This fact has
profound effects on the significance of ESCAPE’s role in helping SPEAD detect novel
Adobe Reader malware. The analysis is framed in this context: when a detection system
detects Adobe Reader malware, what are the odds that the malware is novel?
The answer to this question is determined in the same way the PE/COFF data is
analyzed to determine the odds ratio between two detection systems. Figure 15 illustrates
the odds ratio for each detection system, and they are reported with 95% confidence
intervals. The odds ratios are in terms of the odds of detection being of novel malware.
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In other words, when SPEAD detects Adobe Reader malware, the odds of the malware
being novel in nature is 7.54 times as large as the odds of it being known malware with a
95% confidence interval of 3.55 to 16.03 and a FET two-sided p-value of 8.78e-09. This
p-value is the FET probability for the odds ratio being equal to 1, which is a test to see if
the two populations are statistically the same. SPEAD’s odds ratio and associated pvalue provide conclusive evidence that its malware detection accuracy is statistically
different between the novel and known malware populations. Even though SPEAD’s
odds ratio is 1.68 times higher than the next best, G Data, their confidence intervals do
overlap. This fact is noteworthy, and it reduces but does not eliminate the significance of
SPEAD’s higher odds in detecting novel malware over known malware.

Figure 15: Odds Ratios of Novel:Known Adobe Reader Malware Detection
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Therefore, this analysis leads to the conclusion that SPEAD is comparable to the
best-performing commodity A/V products in terms of novel Adobe Reader malware
detection outright, but when SPEAD detects malware, the odds of it being novel malware
is higher.

This is a highly desirable attribute in a spear phishing attack detection

platform.
One reason for ESCAPE’s success in detecting the novel nature of Adobe Reader
malware in this experiment could be dependent upon the nature of the malware
populations used in the malicious file corpus. The Adobe Reader malware labeled as
novel is the malware collected from the two large, anonymous organizations. It is
possible that the Adobe Reader malware used in attacks against these organizations use
memory corruption exploitation techniques more often than the population of Adobe
Reader malware outside these two organizations. It is also possible that Adobe Reader
malware used in attacks against large organizations, in general, use memory corruption
exploits more often.
Another reason for ESCAPE’s successful focus on novel malware is because it is
unencumbered by the need to detect all known malware. This is unlike the A/V products,
whose commercial viability primarily hinges on its ability to detect as much malware as
possible.
In terms of false positives, a reason for ESCAPE’s false positives is due to its lack
of appropriate exceptions. ESCAPE uses exceptions to handle legitimate application
functionality that is not knowable when ESCAPE creates its database of signed code. It
is possible the false positive Reader files attempt to use Reader functionality for which an
exception has not been created for ESCAPE. Thus, ESCAPE detects this functionality as
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anomalous and therefore malicious. This may also be true with the operating system and
its need to run legitimate code that is unknown to ESCAPE. If this occurs while a file is
being analyzed, ESCAPE will record this anomalous code execution attempt in its log
file. The Python script may incorrectly attribute the anomaly to the file being analyzed,
thus causing a false positive. Because SPEAD’s false positive rate is still significantly
low, it may not detract from SPEAD’s ability to detect novel Reader malware at a high
rate. An experiment with additional Adobe Reader files or on a real-world network may
help characterize the significance, if any, of false positives for this file type.
4.2.2.3 Microsoft Excel Malware Detection Results
Table 11 summarizes the Microsoft Excel malware detection metrics in the
context of novel and known malware. SPEAD’s novel malware detection accuracy
appears to be significantly higher than all but Forefront’s. The Excel sample size is very
small compared to the PE/COFF and Adobe Reader malware sample sizes. With only 29
samples, Forefront’s metrics appear anomalous, but they are impressive nonetheless. A
more sophisticated analysis of the odds ratios is used again to draw conclusions about the
likelihood of Excel malware detection being of novel malware.
Table 11: Microsoft Excel Detection Results for Novel and Known Malware

System

SPEAD
Forefront
G Data
BitDefender
McAfee
AVG

Microsoft Excel
False
Novel
Known
Detection Detection Positive
Rate
Accuracy Accuracy
(%)
(%)
(%)
90.48
8.33
0.67
100.00
100.00
1.00
38.10
87.50
0.00
19.05
12.50
0.00
76.19
87.50
0.00
0.00
75.00
0.00
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The odds ratios for each detection system, in terms of the odds of detection being
of novel Excel malware, are shown in Figure 16. Note that Forefront’s odds ratio is only
1:1 even though it detects 100% of known and novel malware. This is not an anomalous
result indicative of a failure in the odds ratio technique. In fact, the odds ratio for
Forefront makes the point that when even though Forefront may detect all novel Excel
malware, an analyst who needs to know if the malware is novel will do just as well
flipping a coin to make that determination.

The fact that Forefront’s detection is

exceptional is still a significantly valuable characteristic of a spear phishing detection
platform, but so is a platform’s ability to tell an analyst the probability that the malware is
novel.

Figure 16: Odds Ratios of Novel:Known Microsoft Excel Malware Detection
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When SPEAD detects Excel malware, the odds of the malware being novel in
nature are 66.5 times as large as the odds of it being known malware with a 95%
confidence interval of 5.18 to 853.49 and a FET two-sided p-value of 0.00017. Again,
this p-value is the FET probability for the odds ratio being equal to 1, which is a test to
see if the two populations are statistically the same. SPEAD’s odds ratio and associated
p-value provide conclusive evidence that its malware detection accuracy is statistically
different between the novel and known malware populations. The wide confidence
interval is again indicative of the small cell counts in the Excel detection 2x2 table, where
1 out of 8 known malware and 19 out of 21 novel malware are detected. This leaves two
of the cells with counts of 1 and 2 for known malware detected and novel malware
undetected, respectively. This causes a large standard error, and it can be mitigated with
a larger sample size and, presumably, higher cell counts for the 2x2 table.
This analysis leads to the conclusion that SPEAD outperforms the other
commodity A/V products, except Forefront, in terms of novel Microsoft Excel malware
detection. Furthermore, the odds of malware detection being attributed to novel malware
are extremely high only when SPEAD detects it. The strength of this conclusion is
difficult to determine, however, because of the small sample size of Excel malware.
Additional samples of known and novel malware are needed to be able to infer SPEAD’s
detection accuracy to a wider population.
Concerning false positives, the same reasoning applies here as it does in Section
4.2.2.3. ESCAPE may not be tuned appropriately to know all of Microsoft Excel’s
functionality.
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4.2.2.4 Microsoft Word Malware Detection Results
Table 12 summarizes the Microsoft Word malware detection metrics in the
context of novel and known malware. SPEAD’s novel malware detection accuracy is
clearly less than comparable to the commodity A/V detection rates.

With only 22

samples, conclusions that can be drawn from this analysis are not strong. Still, the odds
ratios are used to draw conclusions about the tendencies of Word malware detection
being of novel malware.
Table 12: Microsoft Word Detection Results for Novel and Known Malware

System

SPEAD
Forefront
G Data
BitDefender
McAfee
AVG

Microsoft Word
False
Novel
Known
Detection Detection Positive
Rate
Accuracy Accuracy
(%)
(%)
(%)
22.22
88.89
66.67
66.67
22.22
11.11

7.69
100.00
92.31
23.08
100.00
69.23

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

The odds ratios for each detection system, in terms of the odds of detection being
of novel Word malware, are shown in Figure 17. When SPEAD detects Word malware,
the odds of the malware being novel in nature are 3.43 times as large as the odds of it
being known malware with a 95% confidence interval of 0.26 to 45.03 and a FET twosided p-value of 0.54416.

This p-value suggests that any discrepancy between the

observed odds ratio (3.43) and an odds ratio of 1 is likely due to chance. This is also true
for BitDefender, which has the next highest odds ratio (2.67) and a p-value of 0.37616.
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Figure 17: Odds Ratios of Novel:Known Microsoft Word Malware Detection

Even though SPEAD shows a tendency to focus its detection on novel Word
malware, its significance is diminished in light of SPEAD’s inaccuracy in detecting
malicious Word files in this sample set (only 3 out of 22 detected overall) and the high
probability of this favorable odds ratio being due to chance. Additional samples of
known and novel malware are needed to characterize SPEAD’s detection capabilities
more accurately.
4.2.2.5 Microsoft PowerPoint Malware Detection Results
Table 13 summarizes the Microsoft PowerPoint malware detection metrics in the
context of novel and known malware. SPEAD’s lack of detecting any malicious samples
in this small sample leads to an inconclusive analysis. With only 11 samples, conclusions
that can be drawn from this analysis are weak. However, the detection rates by the
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commodity A/V systems are moderate enough to suggest that these are, in fact, samples
of malicious PowerPoint files. One reason for SPEAD’s lack of detection could be due to
PowerPoint-based attacks not relying on memory corruption exploits. If this is generally
true, ESCAPE is not an ideal malware detection engine for PowerPoint malware.
However, additional samples of known and novel PowerPoint malware are needed to
characterize SPEAD’s detection capabilities more accurately.
Table 13: Microsoft PowerPoint Detection Results for Novel and Known Malware

System

SPEAD
Forefront
G Data
BitDefender
McAfee
AVG

Microsoft PowerPoint
False
Novel
Known
Detection Detection Positive
Rate
Accuracy Accuracy
(%)
(%)
(%)
0.00
0.00
0.00
50.00
100.00
0.00
75.00
85.71
0.00
75.00
85.71
0.00
50.00
57.14
0.00
25.00
71.43
0.00

4.2.3 Comparing URL Detection Metrics
The detection of malicious URLs is a difficult problem to solve due to the fleeting
nature of web-based exploits and how long they are viable and accessible before being
taken down. Table 14 is a good illustration of the fact that the approach to detecting
malicious URLs varies widely. Even though G Data achieves the highest detection
accuracy (29.69%), it also demonstrates the highest false positive rate (25.97%) by far.
This suggests G Data’s detection algorithm or content filtering is, perhaps, overly generic
in its detection. While this is good for malicious detection rates, it also causes G Data to
label numerous URLs as malicious even though they are not. McAfee clearly displays
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the best balance of detection accuracy (25.26%, second highest) with a relatively low
false positive rate (1.06%).
Table 14: URL Detection Results for All Platforms
URLs
System

Detection
Accuracy
(%)

SPEAD
Forefront
G Data
BitDefender
McAfee
AVG

2.92
0.94
29.69
0.00
25.16
0.24

False
Positive
Rate
(%)
0.71
0.00
25.97
0.00
1.06
0.00

There are two important discussion items that are not readily apparent by looking
at only the detection metrics:
1) Malware or malicious code must be actively hosted from a web site for ESCAPE
to detect it. This is a fundamental design feature of ESCAPE, but it makes testing
and comparison difficult to do with certainty. Theoretically, the longer a URL is
known to be malicious, the more likely A/V products and content filtering engines
are to detect it. Conversely, the longer a URL is known to be malicious, the more
likely it is to terminate or limit its active malware hosting due to the everincreasing attention the web site receives from those who are not its intended
victims. This means ESCAPE will not detect the malicious web site where a
commodity A/V product might through the use of a known bad list. Many of the
malicious URLs used in this experiment are more than a month old, which is not
an ideal testing scenario where the focus is on novel malicious code exploits.
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2) Out of the 56 URLs detected in each of the three tests, 35 of them are due to the
download of a PE/COFF file that is deemed to be malicious by MaTR. These
malicious PE/COFF files are saved on the file share. This fact alone provides a
malware or network intrusion analyst a tangible and significant value that
commodity A/V does not. Additionally, the fact that ESCAPE detects a URL as
malicious is a strong indicator that the web site is actively exploiting victims at
the time the email is received that contained the URL. This immediate feedback,
proven by dynamic analysis, is valuable information for an analyst. Therefore,
SPEAD provides two capabilities that the other A/V products do not: malicious
PE/COFF file downloads and immediate confirmation of active and current
malicious websites.
The reasons for false positives in this experiment are the same reasons already
discussed in Sections 4.2.2.2 and 4.2.2.3. There may be Internet Explorer functionality of
which ESCAPE is not aware. Full feature testing may reduce the false positive rate, and
it is a consideration for future research.
4.3

Results and Analysis of Experiment 4
The results of this experiment are used to characterize SPEAD’s latency, which is

the time it takes SPEAD to receive an email and to make a determination whether the
email is malicious or not. It is important to note that SPEAD’s malware detection rates
are not being evaluated in this experiment. This is because MaTR’s and ESCAPE’s
execution environments already process at their maximum configured speeds when a
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queue exists for files or URLs waiting to be analyzed. Thus, a larger queue does not
affect their detection capabilities.
This experiment uses three sizes of file and URL sample sets based on the email
throughput being tested. The appropriate number of files and URLs are selected to allow
for a one-minute duration of emails being sent:


12 files and 240 URLs are selected for the low throughput of 12
attachments/minute and 240 URLs /min



60 files and 1,000 URLs are selected for the expected throughput of 60
attachments/minute and 1,000 URLs /min



300 files and 1,500 URLs are selected for the max throughput of 232
attachments/minute and 1,422 URLs /min

These samples are randomly selected from the malicious and non-malicious PE/COFF
files, non-PE/COFF files, and URLs. Each file type is as equally represented as possible
based on the sample size. The file latency results are analyzed first, followed by the URL
latency results.
4.3.1 File Latency Results and Analysis
The test for each throughput speed is repeated twice for a total of three tests at
each throughput speed. The average latency results for each throughput are calculated,
and the file results are displayed in Figure 18. These plots show a linear growth trend
after an initial slow-growth period, especially when the sample size is large as it is in the
maximum throughput test. These initial slow-growth trends are due to the rapid static
analysis responses offered by MaTR for the PE/COFF files.
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Figure 18: Latency Results for All Files at Each Email Throughput Speed
In order to quantify SPEAD’s file processing latency more accurately, the file
results are segregated into PE/COFF and non-PE/COFF latency responses. Figure 19
shows the plots of the non-PE/COFF latency results. A linear trend line and associated
R2 statistic are calculated and displayed on each plot. The R2 statistic represents the
percentage of the total system response variation that is explained by the explanatory
variable [RaS02], which, in the case of a simple linear regression, is the slope of the line.
The high R2 statistic supports the linear trend line for the expected (98.03%) and
maximum (99.56%) email throughput plots. Because the linear trend line (in red) for the
low throughput plot appears not to fit well (R2 = 83.97%), an exponential model (in
green) is offered as a better fit (R2 = 94.19%) for the small sample size. Based on these
plots, the following qualitative observations are made:
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Figure 19: Latency Results for Non-PE/COFF Files at Each Email Throughput Speed


A perfectly horizontal line means new files received by SPEAD would always
have the same expected wait time regardless of the current queue of files to be
processed. Because these lines show a linear growth, this means there is an
increase in latency for each new file received by SPEAD. This demonstrates,
essentially, a queuing delay within SPEAD. Analogous to a queuing delay in
network routers when packets arrive faster than the router can process them,
SPEAD experiences a queuing delay when emails arrive at a rate faster than they
are processed. This queue consists of the unanalyzed files and URLs in the
malware detection database.



The slopes of the trend lines translate to the expected increase in wait time, and
these increases in latency are estimated to be 7.68 seconds, 8.85 seconds, and 9.04
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seconds for each new file introduced in a low, expected, and maximum
throughput environment, respectively. The exponential model can also be used as
an estimator of the expected file latency at low email throughputs, but its equation
is not as intuitive as the linear equation for the purpose of cursory estimation of
latencies. Additionally, because the expected and maximum throughput models
are distinctly linear with larger samples sizes, it is reasonable to assume the low
throughput model is truly linear. The small sample size (8 files) may not be
sufficient to produce a strong linear trend over time.
The plots of the PE/COFF file latency results are shown in Figure 20. The low
and expected throughput’s linear trend lines both show a predominately horizontal tilt,
indicating a nearly ideal growth in wait time, or lack thereof. The maximum throughput
plot shows both an exponential and linear growth trend for comparison. The following
qualitative observations are made:


The R2 statistic (78.5%) for the low throughput is counterintuitive. Judging by
the difficulty in differentiating the linear trend line from the data’s plotted line, it
appears as though the R2 statistic should be closer to 100%. The R2 statistic is
somewhat lower in this case because there is very little total variation in latency
across these four files. The linear equation explains 78.5% of this small total
variation, which results in a very good-fitting model without a R2 of 100%.



The expected increase in latency for each new PE/COFF file received by SPEAD
is 0.07 seconds for the low and expected workloads.
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Figure 20: Latency Results for PE/COFF Files at Each Email Throughput Speed


By visual inspection of the maximum throughput plot, the exponential trend line
appears to be the better fit. The expected increase in latency for each new
PE/COFF file received by SPEAD is 5.64e0.0178 seconds, or about 0.25 seconds if
the growth is linear, for the maximum throughput.

There appears to be a

saturation point somewhere between the expected and maximum throughput
speeds where the latency growth begins to increase above the 0.07/file linear rate.


If the latency growth is truly linear for the maximum throughput environment,
then there are several possible reasons to explain why the plot appears to be
exponential:
a) The VBscript responsible for calculating the latency metric polls the
database every five seconds. With enough samples over time, the average

96

relative growth in latency between samples (i.e., the slope of the line)
covers up the effect of this polling interval on the observed latency.
However, at the start of an experiment, no latency less than five seconds is
possible because the script will not poll for responses until the five-second
mark. Because of this, the first 14 samples at the start of the maximum
throughput test all have latencies in the six-second range, giving the plot
the appearance of exponential growth as samples 15 and beyond resume a
linear growth in latency.
b) There is a mix of malicious and non-malicious PE/COFF files in the
sample set for the maximum throughput tests. MaTR’s analysis time may
be sensitive to files that are malicious due to the extra traversing of the
decision tree needed to classify the malware’s type as backdoor, Trojan,
worm, etc.

If this is the case, then a run of consecutive malicious

PE/COFF files may slightly skew the latency growth trend line.
Coincidentally, the last 19 files analyzed in the maximum throughput
scenario are all classified as malicious, which may have an additive effect
on the latency growth trend and give it the appearance of an exponential
turn upwards on the graph towards the latter samples.
c) The underlying ESX server may be reaching a processing speed limit due
to the immediate influx of processing needed for 17 virtual images (1
MaTR and 16 ESCAPE) to analyze files and URLs at the maximum
throughput rate.

This may cause noticeable increases in latency for
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relatively small growth trends like that shown by the rapid PE/COFF file
processing.
4.3.2 URL Latency Results and Analysis
The URL latency plots are averages of three tests, just as the file latency plots are.
These plots are displayed in Figure 21. Linear trend lines and R2 statistics are added to
these plots as well as the linear equation used to formulate the trend line. These linear
trend lines fit the plots very well in all three test scenarios with R2 statistics over 99% in
each plot. Thus, a direct comparison of the slopes of the equations can be made. The
expected increases in latency for a new URL received by SPEAD are 3.78 seconds, 3.90
seconds, and 4.04 seconds, respectively, for the low, expected, and maximum throughput
conditions.

Figure 21: Latency Results for URLs at Each Email Throughput Speed
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It is noteworthy that there is only a 0.12 second latency increase going from the
low to the expected throughput, but there is a 0.14 second latency increase going from the
expected to the maximum throughput. This is despite the growth in URLs with the
former (760 URL increase) being much greater than the growth in URLs with the latter
(500 URL increase). This indicates a saturation point for URL processing at throughputs
somewhere between 1,000 and 1,500 URLs per minute.
4.3.3 Overall Latency Analysis
SPEAD’s non-PE/COFF file processing does no better than a latency increase of
about 7.7 seconds per additional file received even at the low email throughput.
Compared to the best URL processing latency of about a 3.8 second increase per
additional URL, it is noteworthy that the non-PE/COFF file processing latency grows at
approximately twice the rate. This may be due to the file-based applications needing
more processing bandwidth or more memory than Internet Explorer, thus requiring a little
more time to open each file and also to terminate the application upon analysis
completion.
SPEAD’s PE/COFF file processing is significantly faster than its non-PE/COFF
file and URL processing. The evidence strongly supports the notion that static analysis is
much quicker than dynamic analysis. SPEAD appears to be able to handle much higher
email throughput rates of PE/COFF files.
Finally, the data is viewed in the context of the research hypothesis that SPEAD
can operate under any sustained traffic workload and still detect novel malware in one
hour or less. Table 15 is the summary of this data. These calculations assume the email
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throughput workload is constant, but traffic that is bursty would have some idle time to
allow SPEAD an opportunity to continue processing queued files and URLs without
introducing new items. For PE/COFF inputs, SPEAD can handle a sustained maximum
workload for over an hour before the latency reaches one hour per item. For nonPE/COFF files, even a low, sustained throughput workload pushes SPEAD’s latency per
file to the one hour mark before 40 minutes. The URL input is slightly better, lasting
until almost 80 minutes at a low workload before SPEAD’s latency reaches one hour per
URL.

This analysis supports a conclusion that the research hypothesis concerning

SPEAD’s latency is not correct. It is important to note that the point of this experiment is
to quantify SPEAD’s non-optimal runtime performance configuration for future
comparison in case SPEAD’s performance is enhanced for optimal runtime speeds.
Table 15: Expected Time to Reach 1 Hour Latency
Low Throughput

Expected Throughput

Time to
Latency # of Items
Latency # of Items
Reach 1
Input Type Growth
until 1
Growth
until 1
Hour
Rate
Hour
Rate
Hour
Latency
(seconds) Latency
(seconds) Latency
(minutes)
PE/COFF
Non-PE/COFF
URL

4.4

0.07
7.68
3.78

50704.23
468.75
952.38

4225.35
39.06
79.37

0.07
8.85
3.90

50704.23
406.78
923.08

Max Throughput

Time to
Latency # of Items
Reach 1
Growth
until 1
Hour
Rate
Hour
Latency
(seconds) Latency
(minutes)
845.07
6.78
15.38

0.25
9.04
4.04

14693.88
398.23
891.09

Time to
Reach 1
Hour
Latency
(minutes)
63.34
1.72
3.84

Summary
This chapter presents and analyzes the data collected from the four experiments

undertaken by this research. The results of Experiment 1 are discussed, and the analysis
conclusions are used to configure ESCAPE for optimal malware detection accuracy with
a consideration for speed. The results of Experiments 2 and 3 are analyzed, and many
conclusions are made. Namely, the original code for SPEAD is validated, and SPEAD
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proves to be a viable option as a complementary email-based malware detection
framework that focuses primarily on novel malware, especially PE/COFF, Adobe Reader,
and Microsoft Excel malware.

Furthermore, SPEAD’s URL detection metrics and

unique detection capabilities are discussed and quantified. Finally, SPEAD’s latency
results are presented and analyzed in order to characterize SPEAD’s performance in
terms of the research hypothesis.
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V.

T

Conclusions

his chapter summarizes the overall conclusions drawn from this research.
Section 5.1 compares the four research goals with the experimental results to

determine if the research goals and hypotheses are met. The significance of this research
is outlined in Section 5.2. Finally, suggestions for future work to extend this research are
provided in Section 5.3.
5.1

Research Conclusions
5.1.1 Goals #1 and #2: Construct a spear phishing detection system
The first goal of this research is to construct an email collection and processing

system to obtain emails, parse them for files and Uniform Resource Locators (URLs),
and insert appropriate information into a database for automated malware analysis. The
second research goal is to modify the execution environment of two malware detection
algorithms, ESCAPE and MaTR (Malware Type Recognition), to interact with this
database for file/URL download and the upload of detection results. Original code is
written to create a framework that accomplishes these first two goals. This framework is
called the SPEar phishing Attack Detection system (SPEAD). Experiment 1 is used to
optimize ESCAPE’s analysis wait time to 10 seconds. The results of Experiment 2 are
used to verify that all files and all URLs are successfully processed and inserted into the
database. This validates the correctness and effectiveness of the original code. Thus, the
first two research goals are achieved.
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5.1.2 Goal #3: Compare this system to the current industry standard
The third goal of this research is to collect malware detection metrics for SPEAD
and commodity anti-virus products to determine SPEAD’s effectiveness in detecting
novel email-borne malware. Experiments 2 and 3 provide ample metrics and data to
perform a comparison. In comparison to the commercial products, SPEAD is the best
performer for the overall detection of all malicious Portable Executable and Common
Object File Format (PE/COFF) files (99.68% true positive rate, 0.39% false positive rate)
as well as novel PE/COFF malware (98.2% true positive rate).
SPEAD’s performance is also statistically comparable to the anti-virus products in
terms of the detection of novel Adobe Reader malware with a 88.79% true positive rate
and the fact that the pairwise differences in means between SPEAD and the other three
top performers is not significantly different from zero (two-sided p-values greater than
0.999 for each pairwise comparison).
Furthermore, SPEAD demonstrates unique advantages in terms of its statistically
strong tendency to focus its detection on novel malware only. Specifically, the odds of a
SPEAD malware detection being attributed to novel malware are as follows:


For PE/COFF files, 42.1:1 odds in favor of SPEAD detecting novel PE/COFF
malware over the next best-performing anti-virus product (95% confidence
interval is 16.84 to 105.14 with two-sided p-value less than 2.2e-16).



For Adobe Reader files, 7.54:1 odds that when SPEAD detects Reader malware,
the malware is novel (95% confidence interval is 3.55 to 16.03 with two-sided pvalue of 8.78e-9). The next best performer is G Data with 4.5:1 odds (95%
confidence interval of 2.10 to 9.64 with two-sided p-value of 3.82e-5).
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For Microsoft Excel files, 66.5:1 odds that when SPEAD detects Excel malware,
the malware is novel (95% confidence interval is 5.88 to 853.49 with two-sided pvalue of 0.00017). The next best performer is BitDefender with 1.65:1 odds (95%
confidence interval of 0.16 to 17.47 with two-sided p-value of 1).
Additionally, SPEAD offers two unique benefits from analysis of email-borne

URLs: 1) automated PE/COFF malware download from malicious URLs (35 downloads
during Experiment 2, and 2) near real time confirmation of active malicious web sites (56
sites detected as malicious). The hypothesis that two malware detection algorithms can
co-exist in an email context while outperforming commodity anti-virus products is
mostly confirmed. Full confirmation is lacking due to SPEAD’s lack of effectiveness in
detecting novel Microsoft Word and PowerPoint malware at a sufficient rate with this
limited sample set. Even though the hypothesis is not fully confirmed, the third research
goal is still achieved, which aimed to quantify SPEAD’s effectiveness in relation to
commodity A/V solutions.
5.1.3 Goal #4: Characterize the detection latency of this system
The fourth goal of this research is to characterize SPEAD detection latency while
using an approximated Air Force base’s email traffic workload. It is important to note
that SPEAD does not have an optimal runtime performance configuration. This research
goal simply aims to take a snapshot of SPEAD’s latency characteristics as a gauge for
future work in this area, if necessary. Experiment 4 performs the necessary tests to
quantify SPEAD’s latencies in varying email traffic workloads. SPEAD’s latencies in
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the worst case scenario (i.e., email throughput of 300 files/minute and 1,500
URLs/minute) are as follows:


For PE/COFF files, analysis is expected to cause one-hour latencies in about
63.34 minutes.



For non-PE/COFF files, analysis is expected to cause one-hour latencies in
about 1.72 minutes.



For URLs, analysis is expected to cause one-hour latencies in about 3.84
minutes.

While the fourth research goal is achieved, the hypothesis that SPEAD can
effectively detect malware under any sustained workload within one hour is not
confirmed.
5.2

Significance of Research
This research provides the Air Force and other large organizations with the

capability for fully automated detection of email spear phishing attacks indicative of
cyber espionage. No other public framework or product exists that combines malware
detection algorithms for the sole purpose of autonomously identifying previously
unknown malicious software and malicious web site links delivered through emails.
SPEAD can be implemented in a plug-and-play manner for any network
enterprise employing Microsoft Exchange as its email service or that can provide emails
to a Microsoft Outlook email client. Its passive network presence and near real time
detection provide network security analysts with the unique benefit of immediate cyber
espionage situational awareness.

Additionally, SPEAD is a good complement to
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traditional anti-virus and anti-spam solutions because of its unique ability to identify the
novel malware attacks many anti-virus solutions and anti-spam engines struggle to find in
email attachments and URLs.
5.3

Recommendations for Future Research
A myriad of extensions to this research are viable.

[MeM11] proposes an

automated framework for the detection of cyber espionage events on a network, and
SPEAD’s spear phishing detection capabilities can be implemented within such a
framework.
SPEAD can also be extended to include an inline network configuration, where
SPEAD’s capabilities are enhanced for automated prevention of novel email attacks.
This requires an optimization study to determine the appropriate configuration and
coding improvements to decrease SPEAD’s latency under varying workloads. Included
in this optimization study could be the addition of more ESCAPE and MaTR virtual
clients to maximize parallel processing.
Since SPEAD is a framework for integrating malware detection algorithms, this
research can be extended to include other cutting edge detection algorithms. Additional
testing could include scenarios where SPEAD’s malware detection algorithms are
complemented by varying anti-virus products to determine the best complementary
configuration for both known and novel malware detection.
An observational study using SPEAD on an operational network would
undoubtedly test SPEAD’s detection of truly novel and previously unknown email-based
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attacks. This study would also validate SPEAD’s URL parsing effectiveness with realworld emails and URLs.
Additionally, the following specific enhancements can be coded, tested, and
evaluated:


Check all incoming URLs against a known good whitelist and known bad
blacklist to reduce the amount of unnecessary URL analysis



Public Key Infrastructure validation: compare the sender of digitally signed
and/or encrypted emails with what is represented in the signature or public key



Parse emails for archive file formats such as .zip and .rar files; automatically
decompress these files for analysis



Parse files for embedded documents (i.e., .pdf embedded in a Word document)



Create a software agent to click on, open, or download items within documents or
on web sites for more in-depth dynamic analysis



Configure SPEAD to revert ESCAPE clients to snapshots every time a malicious
file/URL is detected



Configure SPEAD to implement prioritization of analysis; evaluate the
performance improvement of SPEAD malware detection algorithms re-scanning
old file/URLs during idle time



Create original exploits for each file type for testing SPEAD’s novel malware
detection; same can be applied to web-based attack vectors



Capture ESCAPE’s detection metrics with enough granularity to compare
malware detections on Windows XP to those on Windows Vista and/or Windows
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7 to determine the effectiveness of Windows native memory corruption protection
mechanisms


Perform full feature testing of ESCAPE-protected applications to reduce the false
positive detection rate



Evaluate all ESCAPE configuration factors to determine an optimal configuration
for speed of detection without sacrificing accuracy



Use obfuscated, packed, or compressed malware to evaluate detection limitations
of SPEAD versus commodity anti-virus
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